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A TOO PERMEATING POLICE SURVEILLANCE: 
CONSUMER GENETIC GENEALOGY AND THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT AFTER CARPENTER 
Michael I. Selvin* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On April 24, 2018, in Sacramento, California police arrested 
Joseph James DeAngelo, seventy-two, a grandfather and retired police 
officer, believing him to be the long sought-after Golden State Killer.1 
DeAngelo is suspected of having committed twelve homicides and 
more than fifty rapes, and has been linked to more than 175 crimes.2 
Prosecutors in Sacramento have charged him with twenty-six counts 
of murder and kidnapping.3 
The Golden State Killer, also known as the East Area Rapist, 
terrorized the Sacramento County area during his ten-year spree, from 
1976 to 1986.4 He wore a mask and bound his victims, beginning first 
with single women and moving on to married couples, often raping 
women in front of their husbands before killing them both.5 He 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, May 2020, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Government, 
Dartmouth College, June 2007. Special thanks to Professor Kevin Lapp for his invaluable guidance 
and feedback throughout the writing process. 
 1. T.J. Ortenzi, Hunt for Golden State Killer Led Detectives to Hobby Lobby for DNA 
Sample, WASH. POST (June 1, 2018, 10:53 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2018/06/02/hunt-for-golden-state-killer-led-detectives-to-hobby-lobby-for-dna-
sample/?utm_term=.f091adc76. 
 2. Id.; Golden State Killer Suspect Joseph DeAngelo Arrested in Sacramento, ABC7 
EYEWITNESS NEWS (Apr. 26, 2018), https://abc7chicago.com/golden-state-killer-joseph-james-
deangelo-east-area-rapist-arrested/3390783/. 
 3. Associated Press, DNA Clears Accused Golden State Killer Joseph DeAngelo of 1975 
Murder, NBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2019, 5:37 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/dna-
clears-accused-golden-state-killer-joseph-deangelo-1975-murder-n956566. Prosecutors charged 
the kidnapping counts because the statute of limitations had run on the rape cases. Id. 
 4. Golden State Killer Suspect Joseph DeAngelo Charged with 13 Murders, SKY NEWS 
(Aug. 24, 2018), https://news.sky.com/story/golden-state-killer-suspect-joseph-deangelo-charged-
with-13-murders-11480597. 
 5. Thomas Fuller, How a Genealogy Site Led to the Front Door of the Golden State Killer, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/us/golden-state-killer.html. 
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abruptly ended his spree, investigators believe, in 1986.6 It is unclear 
why.7 
Police had recovered DNA evidence belonging to the perpetrator 
of numerous crimes now linked to DeAngelo, but at the time could not 
match the samples to any suspects.8 The case went cold for four 
decades, but investigators had not given up.9 Sacramento cold case 
detective Paul Holes hired Barbara Rae-Venter, a retired patent 
attorney from California who made a hobby of helping adopted people 
find their birth parents using commercial genealogy websites.10 
Investigators created a profile of the unknown perpetrator’s DNA and 
uploaded the profile to GEDmatch, an online commercial genealogy 
database intended to allow users to upload their own genetic profiles 
and search for unknown relatives.11 Rae-Venter ran a search of the 
suspected perpetrator’s DNA profile against the nearly one million 
user profiles then comprising GEDmatch’s database,12 and identified 
several users who were third cousins of the source of the cold case 
DNA.13 
Holes and Rae-Venter then started building family trees around 
these third cousins, attempting to find a common ancestor.14 In all, it 
took a team of five investigators four months to identify DeAngelo.15 
Finding a common ancestor proved difficult, as many of the suspect’s 
 
 6. Justin Jouvenal, To Find Alleged Golden State Killer, Investigators First Found His Great-
Great-Great-Grandparents, WASH. POST (Apr. 30, 2018, 3:22 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/to-find-alleged-golden-state-killer-
investigators-first-found-his-great-great-great-grandparents/2018/04/30/3c865fe7-dfcc-4a0e-
b6b2-0bec548d501f_story.html. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Heather Murphy, She Helped Crack the Golden State Killer Case. Here’s What She’s 
Going to Do Next, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/science/ba
rbara-rae-venter-gsk.html. 
 11. See id. 
 12. As of November 2019, the GEDmatch database had 1.3 million user profiles. Kashmir Hill 
& Heather Murphy, Your DNA Profile Is Private? A Florida Judge Just Said Otherwise, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/05/business/dna-database-search-
warrant.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share (last updated Dec. 30, 2019). 
 13. Jocelyn Kaiser, We Will Find You: DNA Search Used to Nab Golden State Killer Can 
Home in on About 60% of White Americans, SCI. MAG. (Oct. 11, 2018, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/10/we-will-find-you-dna-search-used-nab-golden-state-
killer-can-home-about-60-white. 
 14. Murphy, She Helped Crack the Golden State Killer Case, supra note 10. 
 15. Jouvenal, supra note 6. 
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relatives were recent Italian immigrants, preventing the team from 
tracing their lineages farther back.16 The team had more success 
investigating relatives on the English side of the identified individuals’ 
lineages and eventually was able to formulate rough family trees.17 
Utilizing birth and death certificates, marriage records, social 
media profiles, census data, and news stories, Rae-Venter and her 
team eventually traced twenty-five family trees back to a common 
ancestor, a great-great-great grandparent of both the GEDmatch users 
identified in the search and the source of the forensic DNA.18 They 
then worked forward from the common ancestor, looking for relatives 
in the lineage who fit the profile of the Golden State Killer based on 
his approximate age when the crimes were committed and his 
residency in or near Sacramento.19 
Numerous suspects emerged, including DeAngelo.20 Rae-Venter 
used a DNA analytics tool on GEDmatch that predicted the killer’s 
DNA likely belonged to someone with blue eyes.21 She also used a 
health risk analysis website called Promethease.com to determine that 
the suspect likely began balding prematurely.22 Of the suspects Rae-
Venter’s team had honed in on, only DeAngelo had blue eyes and a 
receding hairline.23 
Sacramento detectives then surveilled DeAngelo’s home for three 
days.24 On April 18, 2018, they followed him to a Hobby Lobby store 
in Roseville, California.25 While he was in the store, investigators 
swabbed the handle of his car for DNA and sent it to the crime lab.26 
They also removed a tissue from his garbage and sent it to a crime lab 
for DNA testing.27 Both samples matched DNA collected from the 
scene of a rape and murder in 1980 that was long suspected of having 
been committed by the Golden State Killer.28 Police arrested 
 
 16. Murphy, She Helped Crack the Golden State Killer Case, supra note 10. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id.; Jouvenal, supra note 6. 
 19. Jouvenal, supra note 6. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Murphy, She Helped Crack the Golden State Killer Case, supra note 10. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Ortenzi, supra note 1. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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DeAngelo days later, and a DNA sample taken upon arrest matched 
more than ten cold case murders in California.29 
Whether genetic genealogical investigations utilizing commercial 
databases by law enforcement implicate the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is an open question. 
Indeed, it is difficult to neatly apply traditional Fourth Amendment 
doctrine to the technique to even determine whether such 
investigations would qualify as searches subject to the Fourth 
Amendment. Under the traditional third-party doctrine, databased 
individuals would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their 
genetic data voluntarily uploaded to publicly available databases.30 
But what about the relatives of these individuals, both the intermediate 
relatives on a given family tree between the database user and the 
source of the forensic DNA sample, and the suspect ultimately 
identified by the investigation? Genetic information is shared amongst 
relatives, and in a given investigation, genetic and other highly 
intimate personal information is revealed. Does the technique 
constitute a search of database users’ relatives who did not voluntarily 
provide their genetic information to any database? And as the use of 
this method of investigation continues to grow, with no guidelines and 
little oversight,31 what safeguards and limits should be imposed? 
This Note begins with an explanation of how genetic genealogical 
investigations are conducted and discusses the technique’s rapid 
development and use in criminal investigations nationwide after 
DeAngelo’s arrest was announced. Part III provides an overview of 
traditional uses of DNA in criminal investigations utilizing the FBI’s 
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS): direct-match searching and 
the more controversial, and less widely accepted, partial-match 
familial searching. Part III further explains why the constitutional 
underpinnings of CODIS do not apply to commercial genetic 
genealogical investigations. Part IV considers whether genetic 
genealogical investigations would be considered constitutional 
searches under traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine and under the 
 
 29. Fuller, supra note 5. 
 30. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“[A] person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”). 
 31. Sarah Zhang, The Messy Consequences of the Golden State Killer Case, ATLANTIC 
(Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2019/10/genetic-genealogy-dna-
database-criminal-investigations/599005/. 
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Supreme Court’s recent decision in Carpenter v. United States.32 
Assuming that genetic genealogical investigations are constitutional 
searches, Part IV then discusses whether such searches are lawful and 
under what circumstances. Last, Part V argues that effective 
legislation must be enacted to place limits on law enforcement use of 
the technique and highlights a number of factors and policy 
considerations that must be carefully weighed and considered in 
crafting any such legislation. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  GEDmatch 
Amongst commercial genealogy websites, GEDmatch has 
emerged as law enforcement’s favorite for criminal investigations.33 It 
functions differently than its higher profile counterparts, such as 
Ancestry and 23andMe.34 Ancestry and 23andMe prohibit use of their 
services by law enforcement entirely,35 whereas GEDmatch currently 
allows law enforcement to search profiles of consenting users for 
certain crimes and until recently granted law enforcement access to all 
user profiles to investigate violent crimes.36 And the process by which 
an Ancestry or 23andMe user creates his or her DNA profile makes 
these sites more difficult for law enforcement to utilize than 
GEDmatch.37 Most DNA testing services require users to mail in a 
sample of their saliva in a standardized container, which the service 
then analyzes in its own lab to create a DNA profile that is uploaded 
to the site.38 It would be difficult for law enforcement to utilize such 
 
 32. 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
 33. Heather Murphy, How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold Case 
Investigations, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/science/gedmatch-genealogy-cold-cases.html. 
 34. Fuller, supra note 5. 
 35. Kate Snow & Jon Schuppe, ‘This is Just the Beginning’: Using DNA and Genealogy to 
Crack Years-Old Cold Cases, NBC NEWS (July 18, 2018, 1:30 AM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/just-beginning-using-dna-genealogy-crack-years-old-
cold-cases-n892126. 
 36. Zhang, supra note 31. 
 37. Murphy, How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold Case Investigations, 
supra note 33. 
 38. Fuller, supra note 5. 
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services because they will not accept blood or semen samples,39 crime 
scene evidence, or DNA profiles generated in other labs.40 
GEDmatch, based out of a small house in Florida owned by one 
of its founders, functions very differently.41 It has no lab.42 Instead, it 
allows users to upload DNA profiles generated elsewhere, without 
regard for the DNA’s source or the reliability of the labs in which 
DNA profiles were originally tested.43 GEDmatch is different from its 
competitors in that it is not a DNA testing service, but a publicly 
searchable database that allows users who have had their DNA 
analyzed elsewhere to more deeply investigate their ancestry.44 
GEDmatch is also better equipped than other services for criminal 
investigations due to the technology employed by the site itself. 
GEDmatch analyzes autosomal DNA single nucleotide 
polymorphisms, which are passed down by both males and females 
along all ancestral lines.45 This type of DNA data allows for 
comparison of any two individuals regardless of how they are 
related.46 GEDmatch searches hundreds of thousands of DNA 
markers, looking for long stretches that match, thus indicating familial 
ties.47 GEDmatch allows users to see precisely where these segments 
of their DNA overlap with those of their relatives and to what extent.48 
In this way, a user can determine not only to whom on the site they are 
related, but how.49 GEDmatch can consistently match relatives as 
distant as third cousins and, to a professionally trained genealogist, 
convey crucial information regarding how they are related.50 A recent 
 
 39. See id. 
 40. See Murphy, How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold Case 
Investigations, supra note 33. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. Fuller, supra note 5. 
 44. Murphy, How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold Case Investigations, 
supra note 33. 
 45. How Genetic Genealogy Works, PARABON NANOLABS, https://snapshot.parabon-
nanolabs.com/intro#genealogy-how (last visited Apr. 5, 2020); see Concepts—CentiMorgans 
SNPs and Pickin’ Crab, DNAEXPLAINED, https://dna-explained.com/2016/03/30/concepts- 
centimorgans-snps-and-pickin-crab/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
 46. How Genetic Genealogy Works, supra note 45. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Murphy, How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold Case Investigations, 
supra note 33. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
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study determined that the technology could narrow down the identity 
of an anonymous source of DNA to less than twenty potential 
individuals in a database of 1.3 million utilizing nothing but the 
sample and an approximate age.51 
B.  Genealogy Experts 
While GEDmatch’s analytics are highly effective, the data it 
provides are relatively useless for solving cold cases without the 
assistance of a trained genealogy expert.52 One such expert, CeCe 
Moore of Parabon Nanolabs, has recently emerged among the experts 
most commonly used by law enforcement and, following numerous 
television and press interviews, has become a public face of genetic 
genealogy criminal investigations.53 
Parabon Nanolabs is based out of Reston, Virginia, and is 
comprised of roughly twenty employees.54 In 2011, in conjunction 
with the Department of Defense, Parabon developed its first program 
to assist law enforcement in cold case investigations.55 Parabon’s lab 
would analyze cold case DNA samples to create computer-generated 
sketches of what their owners might look like.56 Hundreds of police 
departments signed up for the service.57 As the program continued to 
grow, Parabon developed technology to analyze and compare 
autosomal DNA from samples submitted to its lab in an effort to 
identify people based on distant relatives.58 Following the publicity 
surrounding Joseph DeAngelo’s arrest as the Golden State Killer, 
Parabon hired Moore, a traditional genealogist, and began offering its 
services to police departments to employ the same genetic genealogy 
investigative techniques used to identify DeAngelo to solve other cold 
cases.59 
 
 51. Kaiser, supra note 13. 
 52. Murphy, How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold Case Investigations, 
supra note 33. 
 53. Snow & Schuppe, supra note 35. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Megan Molteni, The Future of Crime-Fighting Is Family Tree Forensics, WIRED (Dec. 26, 
2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/the-future-of-crime-fighting-is-family-tree-
forensics/. 
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Police departments send cold case DNA samples to Parabon, 
which processes the samples in its lab and creates autosomal DNA 
profiles in a format compatible with GEDmatch.60 Parabon uploads 
these profiles to GEDmatch, and Moore searches the database for 
relatives.61 As in the Golden State Killer investigation, Moore builds 
family trees of each identified relative backward in time until she finds 
a common ancestor, using public records such as marriage and birth 
certificates, obituaries, social media profiles, census records and news 
articles.62 She then works forward until she arrives at potential 
suspects in the family lineage that fit the perpetrator’s profile.63 These 
suspects are then given to the police to investigate further.64 
While the initial investigation of DeAngelo took thousands of law 
enforcement man-hours, the process has been refined and streamlined, 
and is rapidly becoming much more efficient.65 Parabon has said it 
finds partial matches to cold case DNA samples on GEDmatch in 60 
percent of its cases and expects that rate to grow as more people upload 
their genetic profiles to the site.66 
C.  Aftermath of the Golden State Killer Case 
In just over a year, use of this technique by law enforcement has 
grown at exponential rates.67 Parabon has helped solve numerous cold 
cases in recent months, including the 1988 murder of an eight-year-
old girl in Indiana, the 1987 killing of a couple in Washington, and the 
1992 homicide of a woman in Pennsylvania.68 Genealogists have 
identified over forty cold case suspects since Joseph DeAngelo.69 
The technique has become much more efficient as well, 
producing results at ever-increasing speed. In September, 2018, 
Sacramento police identified Roy Charles Waller as the suspect in the 
commission of ten unsolved rapes by uploading his DNA profile to 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Snow & Schuppe, supra note 35. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Murphy, How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold Case Investigations, 
supra note 33; Murphy, She Helped Crack the Golden State Killer Case, supra note 10. 
 66. Snow & Schuppe, supra note 35. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Zhang, supra note 31. 
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GEDmatch and identifying a close relative.70 His arrest was only the 
fifteenth instance GEDmatch was used to solve a cold case following 
DeAngelo’s arrest,71 and investigators identified Waller as their 
suspect within mere hours of uploading his DNA to GEDmatch.72 
Yet the widespread use of the technique by law enforcement, with 
little formal oversight, has sparked user backlash and bitter debate 
within the genealogical community.73 User backlash caused by 
GEDmatch’s decision to break its own terms of service led it to 
overhaul its policy regarding law enforcement use of the database 
entirely.74 Prior to May 18, 2019, GEDmatch’s terms of service 
disclosed to its users that it accepted “DNA obtained and authorized 
by law enforcement to either: (1) identify a perpetrator of a violent 
crime against another individual; or (2) identify remains of a deceased 
individual.”75 GEDmatch defined “violent crime” as “homicide or 
sexual assault.”76 However, in November 2018, GEDmatch allowed 
law enforcement access to investigate a lesser crime.77 Detectives in 
Centerville, Utah were investigating the attack of a seventy-one-year-
old woman, who was choked by her assailant until she lost 
consciousness but survived.78 She was not sexually assaulted.79 When 
Parabon informed the detectives they could not upload the DNA found 
at the scene to GEDmatch because the attack did not constitute a 
violent crime under GEDmatch’s terms of service, the detectives 
approached Curtis Rogers of GEDmatch and Steven Armentrout of 
 
 70. Murphy, How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold Case Investigations, 
supra note 33. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Zhang, supra note 31. 
 74. Peter Aldhous, This Genealogy Database Helped Solve Dozens of Crimes. But Its New 
Privacy Rules Will Restrict Access by Cops, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 19, 2019, 4:51 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/peteraldhous/this-genealogy-database-helped-solve-
dozens-of-crimes-but. 
 75. GEDMatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20190506040926/https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last visited 
May 6, 2019) (version prior to May 18, 2019 update). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Pat Reavy, Plastic Milk Container, Genealogy Helped Utah Police Crack Church Assault 
Case, KSL.COM (May 13, 2019, 3:42 PM), https://www.ksl.com/article/46551323/plastic-milk-
container-genealogy-helped-utah-police-crack-church-assault-case. 
 78. Id. 
 79. See id. 
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Parabon for permission.80 They consented, and Parabon’s genealogists 
were able to trace the DNA sample to a great-uncle of the source and 
ultimately to the source himself.81 In April 2019, he was arrested and 
charged with aggravated assault and aggravated burglary.82 
Mere days after news broke of the Utah investigation, user 
backlash caused GEDmatch to revise its terms of service.83 It now 
allows law enforcement to upload DNA “to identify a perpetrator of a 
violent crime against another individual, where ‘violent crime’ is 
defined as murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, aggravated rape, 
robbery, or aggravated assault.”84 However, GEDmatch created new 
privacy settings for its DNA profiles. Users’ profiles are all set to 
private by default, restricting their data from ever being found in a 
search. They can then choose to change their privacy preference to 
“Public + opt-out,” in which “DNA data is [sic] available for 
comparison to any Raw Data in the GEDmatch database, except DNA 
kits identified as being uploaded for law enforcement purposes,” or to 
“Public + opt-in,” allowing for matches to DNA uploaded by law 
enforcement.85 
Because all GEDmatch users now have to affirmatively opt-in, 
many profiles are beyond law enforcement’s reach, greatly 
diminishing the efficacy of the technique, at least for now. Thus far, 
only 185,000 of GEDmatch’s 1.3 million users have chosen to opt-
in,86 greatly hindering its utility in criminal investigations.87 While this 
approach may temporarily allay concerns about law enforcement 
intrusion into millions of people’s private genetic information, it 
returns some level of control over such information to GEDmatch’s 
users only. It does nothing to address the legitimate privacy interests 
of the relatives of users who choose to opt-in—millions of people who 
 
 80. Peter Aldhous, The Arrest of a Teen on an Assault Charge Has Sparked New Privacy 
Fears About DNA Sleuthing, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 14, 2019, 10:15 PM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/peteraldhous/genetic-genealogy-parabon-gedmatch-
assault. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. GEDMatch.Com Terms of Service and Privacy Policy, GEDMATCH, 
https://www.gedmatch.com/tos.htm (last updated Dec. 9, 2019). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Hill & Murphy, supra note 12. 
 87. Zhang, supra note 31. 
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have never uploaded their DNA to the site, nor consented to have their 
genetic information implicated in criminal investigations. Users, 
therefore, decide whether or not law enforcement can access not only 
their own genetic information, but that of their extended family as 
well. 
Whether such investigations intrude on the protected Fourth 
Amendment interests of these relatives, including relative-suspects 
ultimately identified through this technique, is currently an open 
question. William Talbott II was convicted in June 2019 of the 1987 
murder of a young Canadian couple.88 Investigators identified Mr. 
Talbott by utilizing GEDmatch and Parabon, yet his defense attorneys 
never challenged the constitutionality of the technique at trial.89 
Rachel Forde, Mr. Talbott’s Snohomish County public defender, 
stated she felt the evidence was not relevant because police only used 
it to generate a lead, not to support probable cause to obtain the arrest 
warrant, and it was not introduced at trial.90 Indeed, the technique does 
not fit neatly into the traditional Fourth Amendment analytical 
framework, nor does the Supreme Court’s reasoning for finding 
CODIS searches constitutional apply. 
III.  FORENSIC DNA IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 
The use of DNA by law enforcement in criminal investigations is 
common nationwide. Two techniques utilizing forensic DNA 
databases were well established prior to the advent of commercial 
genealogy investigations: direct-match searching and partial-match 
familial searching. Both utilize CODIS, a software program 
authorized by Congress and supervised by the FBI, which allows law 
enforcement to search numerous state and national databases of 
arrestee DNA profiles.91 
 
 88. Heather Murphy, Genealogy Sites Have Helped Identify Suspects. Now They’ve Helped 
Convict One, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/01/us/dna-genetic-
genealogy-trial.html. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Jason Tashea, Genealogy Sites Give Law Enforcement a New DNA Sleuthing Tool, but the 
Battle Over Privacy Looms, A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2019, 4:20 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/family-tree-genealogy-sites-arm-law-enforcement-
with-a-new-branch-of-dna-sleuthing-but-the-battle-over-privacy-looms?ut. 
 91. Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FBI, 
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
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The Supreme Court held the collection of DNA from arrestees 
and direct-match searches of CODIS constitutional in Maryland v. 
King.92 But the characteristics of direct-match searches the Court 
focused on in reaching its holding—that the DNA collected did not 
reveal intimate biological information of source individuals,93 and that 
the purpose of direct-matching was identification, rather than criminal 
investigation94—do not apply to genetic genealogy. Rather, genetic 
genealogy more closely resembles partial-match familial searches of 
CODIS, an investigative technique only authorized in a handful of 
states.95 The Supreme Court has not considered the constitutionality 
of partial-match familial searching, and it does not fit neatly into 
traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine. Moreover, the most troubling 
characteristics of partial-match CODIS searching are further 
exacerbated in the context of genetic genealogy investigations, and 
thus must inform the analysis of whether genetic genealogical 
investigations should be deemed constitutional. 
A.  Direct-Match Searches Using CODIS 
CODIS facilitates searches across the National DNA Index 
System (NDIS) and state DNA databases for DNA profiles that match 
suspects’ DNA left at a crime scene.96 NDIS is comprised of multiple 
databases, including a Convicted Offender or Arrestee Index, and a 
Forensic Index.97 CODIS also integrates state indexes, which are 
separately maintained pursuant to state law, with varying criteria 
determining when arrestees and/or convicted felons must submit their 
DNA for inclusion.98 
CODIS primarily employs a form of DNA typing known as 
single-tandem repeat (STR) typing, which counts and compares repeat 
 
 92. 569 U.S. 435 (2013). 
 93. Id. at 449. 
 94. Id. at 464. 
 95. James Rainey, Familial DNA Puts Elusive Killers Behind Bars. But Only 12 States Use It, 
NBC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/familial-dna-
puts-elusive-killers-behind-bars-only-12-states-n869711. 
 96. Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 91. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
291, 296 (2010); JULIE E. SAMUELS ET AL., URBAN INST., COLLECTING DNA AT ARREST:     
POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND IMPLICATIONS iii (2013),  
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/242812.pdf. 
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sequences at twenty locations,99 known as “loci,” across a genomic 
strand.100 Two of these repeat sequences, known as “alleles,” are 
recorded at each locus, yielding forty measurements that comprise the 
DNA profile stored in NDIS and state databases.101 All fifty states 
collect DNA samples and create profiles based on the same twenty 
loci, so as to be compatible with the CODIS software.102 
To utilize CODIS in a criminal investigation, law enforcement 
first submits a forensic sample of the crime scene DNA to a lab in 
order to create a profile based on the alleles at all twenty loci.103 
Investigators then upload this profile to CODIS, which runs a query 
against the Offender and Forensic Indexes of every state database and 
the NDIS, looking for a match.104 If CODIS returns a match, the law 
enforcement agency laboratories responsible for creating the queried 
profile and the database match communicate to confirm the match, 
share identifying information, and coordinate further investigative 
steps between the two agencies.105 A match in a Forensic Index would 
indicate that there may be a common perpetrator of two separate 
crimes.106 A match in an Offender Index would indicate that the 
offender of a past crime, or a suspect arrested on suspicion of a past 
crime, deposited DNA at the crime scene currently being 
investigated.107 In short, “CODIS sets uniform national standards for 
DNA matching and then facilitates connections between local law 
enforcement agencies who can share more specific information about 
matched STR profiles.”108 
The Supreme Court considered the Fourth Amendment 
implications of warrantless forensic DNA collection in Maryland v. 
King.109 The Court held that the mandatory collection of DNA by 
means of a buccal swab of a suspect’s inner cheek, when the suspect 
 
 99. From its inception in 1998 until December 31, 2016, CODIS profiles recorded thirteen 
loci. As of January 1, 2017, CODIS Core Loci now include twenty loci. Frequently Asked Questi
ons on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 91. 
 100. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 98, at 295. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 91. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 445 (2013). 
 109. See id. 
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had been arrested for a serious offense supported by probable cause, 
constituted a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.110 The 
Court determined a buccal swab of the inner cheek to be a search, as 
“[v]irtually any ‘intrusio[n] into the human body’” will constitute a 
search under the Fourth Amendment.111 When analyzing the 
reasonableness of Maryland’s statute, which required the collection of 
DNA from suspects arrested and charged with a crime or attempted 
crime of violence or burglary, the Court identified and weighed the 
government’s interests in collecting and databasing arrestee’s DNA 
against the interests of the arrestee, who the Court determined had a 
diminished expectation of privacy in police custody.112 
The Court identified five discrete governmental interests. First, it 
focused on “the need for law enforcement officers in a safe and 
accurate way to process and identify the persons and possessions they 
must take into custody.”113 The Court likened the collection of a DNA 
sample for identification purposes to both fingerprint identification of 
arrestees and to the comparison of a person’s face to a wanted poster 
of an unidentified suspect.114 “Finding occurrences of the arrestee’s 
CODIS profile in outstanding cases is consistent with this common 
practice. It uses a different form of identification than a name or 
fingerprint, but its function is the same.”115 
Second, the Court recognized the state’s interest in identifying the 
suspect and linking him to past crimes as a means of identifying his 
propensity for violence and the resulting danger his custody may pose 
for law enforcement in charge of holding him.116 Third, the Court 
pointed to the state’s interest in ensuring the suspect shows up for trial 
and in making decisions regarding his bail, by linking the suspect to 
past unsolved crimes while still in police custody.117 Fourth, the Court 
determined that discovery of past crimes through DNA matching can 
alert a court of an arrestee’s propensity for violence that could pose a 
 
 110. Id. at 465–66. 
 111. Id. at 446 (second alteration in original) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 
770 (1966)). 
 112. Id. at 461–62. 
 113. Id. at 449. 
 114. Id. at 445, 451–52. 
 115. Id. at 452. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 453. 
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danger to the public, further informing bail determinations.118 Last, the 
Court noted that connecting an arrestee with a past crime may “have 
the salutary effect of freeing a person wrongfully imprisoned for the 
same offense.”119 
The Court weighed these interests against the “degree to which 
the search invades an [arrestee’s] legitimate expectations of 
privacy.”120 It looked at both the invasiveness of the inner cheek 
buccal swab, which it determined was a negligible intrusion,121 and an 
arrestee’s diminished expectation of privacy.122 The Court emphasized 
that “the necessary predicate of a valid arrest for a serious offense is 
fundamental.”123 Thus, the Court held that the taking of DNA by 
buccal swab from an arrestee with a diminished expectation of privacy 
was “[a] brief intrusion . . . subject to the Fourth Amendment, but a 
swab of this nature [did] not increase the indignity already attendant 
to normal incidents of arrest,” and was therefore reasonable when 
weighed against the significant government interests previously 
identified.124 
The Court deemed the initial collection of the DNA sample to be 
the search that triggered the Fourth Amendment, and hastily dismissed 
the implications of law enforcement’s analysis and conversion of the 
sample into a profile that could then be searched across all CODIS-
linked databases after the DNA was collected.125 The Court reasoned 
that “the processing of respondent’s DNA sample’s 13 CODIS loci 
did not intrude on respondent’s privacy in a way that would make his 
DNA identification unconstitutional”126 because the genetic 
information recorded at these loci does not code for specific proteins 
capable of revealing hereditary traits but rather can only be used for 
identification purposes; the Court labeled this genetic information 
“junk.”127 Importantly, the Court emphasized that “[i]f in the future 
police analyze samples to determine, for instance, an arrestee’s 
 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 455. 
 120. Id. at 461. 
 121. Id. at 446. 
 122. Id. at 462. 
 123. Id. at 461 
 124. Id. at 464. 
 125. See id. at 464–65. 
 126. Id. at 464. 
 127. Id. at 445. 
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predisposition for a particular disease or other hereditary factors not 
relevant to identity, that case would present additional privacy 
concerns not present here.”128 
Because the DNA analysis revealed no personal medical or 
hereditary information, and the CODIS search was likened to a search 
of fingerprint records for purely identification purposes, the King 
Court found such searches constitutional even in the absence of 
individualized suspicion and a warrant. In reaching this conclusion, 
however, the Court completely ignored the purpose for which CODIS 
searches are most often performed: to find and identify suspects of 
unsolved crimes.129 Justice Scalia, in dissent, repeatedly stressed the 
Maryland statute’s true purpose—ordinary criminal investigation and 
evidence-gathering—which he argued is always prohibited by the 
Fourth Amendment absent individualized suspicion.130 He argued that 
a reasonableness inquiry should only be undertaken if the 
suspicionless search was performed for a government purpose other 
than solving crimes, under the special needs doctrine.131 “No matter 
the degree of invasiveness, suspicionless searches are never allowed 
if their principal end is ordinary crime-solving.”132 Because the 
arrestee’s DNA would be searched against a database of forensic DNA 
from unsolved crimes for which he was not a suspect, Justice Scalia 
argued, such a search should be prohibited by the Fourth Amendment 
without a warrant.133 Scalia warned in dissent that the ramifications of 
the majority’s decision would be that “your DNA can be taken and 
entered into a national DNA database if you are ever arrested, rightly 
or wrongly, and for whatever reason.”134 The Court did not address 
this fear, however, instead accepting the argument that the primary 
 
 128. Id. at 464–65. 
 129. Id. at 474–75 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 130. Id. at 466. 
 131. Id. at 468. 
 132. Id. at 469 (emphasis in original). 
 133. Id. at 480–81. 
 134. Id. at 481. While widespread collection of DNA by law enforcement for minor crimes has 
not come to pass in the ensuing six years since King, the rapid increase of commercial genealogy 
databases in criminal investigations, the extremely wide net such searches can cast, and the detailed 
information such databases provide, are creating an ad hoc national database by association that, 
combined with law enforcement’s use of genealogical investigative techniques, may become even 
more potent than the national DNA database Scalia feared. 
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purpose of CODIS was identification, rather than criminal 
investigation and thus finding it constitutional. 
B.  Partial Match Familial Searching 
While direct-match searches utilizing CODIS are widespread and 
common throughout all fifty states and various federal law 
enforcement agencies, partial-match familial DNA searching (FDS) is 
far rarer and more controversial. A CODIS query can be set to high, 
medium, or low stringency, determining how many loci must match 
for the system to yield a “matching” profile.135 A high level stringency 
query requires all twenty loci to match, indicating the unidentified 
DNA sample originated from the same person whose profile the 
CODIS query returned. But moderate and low level stringency queries 
will return profile results that only match some of the loci, indicating 
that the person from whom the unidentified DNA originated is a 
relative of the CODIS DNA profile that the query returned.136 But the 
CODIS software is not designed for FDS, and it fails to take into 
account that certain combinations of genetic information on certain 
alleles at each loci are more common in the general population than 
others.137 As a result, some states have developed software for 
intentional familial searching that further analyzes partial matches to 
determine the probabilities that certain allelic matches indicate 
familial relationships, based upon their relative scarcity in the general 
public.138 Matches of common allelic combinations have a lower 
chance of indicating familial relationships than matches of rarer 
combinations.139 
Twelve states explicitly allow FDS by law enforcement,140 while 
six states explicitly prohibit it.141 Maryland and the District of 
 
 135. SARA DEBUS-SHERRILL & MICHAEL B. FIELD, NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE 
SERV., UNDERSTANDING FAMILIAL DNA SEARCHING: POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND POTENTIAL 
IMPACT 3 (2017), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/251043.pdf. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 98, at 300. 
 138. Id. at 302–03. 
 139. Id. at 295, 343–44. 
 140. Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Illinois and Louisiana are currently considering legislation. 
Rainey, supra note 95. 
 141. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 98, at 302; Natalie Ram, Incidental Informants: 
Police Can Use Genealogy Databases to Help Identify Criminal Relatives—but Should They?, MD. 
B. J., July–Aug. 2018, at 8, 11–12. 
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Columbia have enacted statutes banning the practice, and the rest do 
so through regulations or law enforcement policy.142 The remaining 
states take a more flexible non-statutory approach, often allowing 
“unintentional” partial match reporting but not intentional familial 
searching, a distinction some have criticized as a merely rhetorical 
attempt to allow the practice while avoiding public criticism and 
controversy.143 While the FBI does not allow familial searching of 
NDIS, it does allow moderate stringency searches, which can be 
effective in finding matches to forensic samples that contain more than 
one person’s DNA.144 
Although the constitutionality of familial DNA searching has 
been widely debated, it has yet to be decided by courts. Nationally, 
FDS is quite uncommon.145 California, for example, explicitly allows 
it, yet when cases that utilized FDS to generate leads have gone to trial 
there, prosecutors generally have not introduced the results of these 
searches into evidence, and defense attorneys have not challenged the 
legality of the practice.146 A recent case study of FDS policies in 
California noted: 
Interviewees147 generally expressed confidence that an FDS 
case would be treated like a regular CODIS DNA match case 
and that the use of FDS would not likely be raised in court. 
Interviewees explained that FDS is just another investigative 
tool for law enforcement and, as with any other tool, is not 
explicitly brought up in court unless the defense raises it as 
an issue (most likely during pre-trial motions). Interviewees 
also argued that FDS cases are no different than any other 
case dealing with DNA and do not raise any unique 4th 
 
 142. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 98, at 302; Ram, supra note 141, at 11. 
 143. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 98, at 341. 
 144. Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, supra note 91. 
 145. See Rainey, supra note 95 (“The practice remains so uncommon that experts aren’t sure 
how many detectives and prosecutors are even aware DNA can provide an indirect pathway to 
suspects.”). 
 146. MICHAEL B. FIELD ET AL., NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., STUDY OF 
FAMILIAL DNA SEARCHING: POLICIES AND PRACTICES 19, 21 (2017),  
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/251081.pdf. 
 147. Eighteen stakeholders were interviewed in California, encompassing representatives of 
state and local crime labs, the police, prosecutors, the judiciary, a civil liberties attorney, a victim’s 
advocate and policy staff. Id. at 2. 
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Amendment questions compared to traditional DNA 
cases.148 
And yet the constitutionality of familial DNA searching has been 
widely debated by legal scholars. The shared nature of DNA between 
genetic relatives causes familial DNA searches to “frustrate ordinary 
principles of Fourth Amendment analysis.”149 There tends to be 
agreement amongst scholars that FDS would likely be permissible 
under traditional Fourth Amendment doctrine, but perhaps only 
because “familial searches fall between the cracks of a range of 
uncertain constitutional doctrines with regard to even the most 
preliminary question of whether the Fourth Amendment applies.”150 
First, there is the unclear preliminary question of whose privacy 
interests would be violated in an FDS case—the databased arrestee, 
his or her relatives, or both.151 The source of an indexed DNA profile, 
an arrestee, could not assert a Fourth Amendment challenge, as the 
arrestee would have been lawfully profiled and indexed under King, 
based on the arrestee’s diminished expectation of privacy.152 
Moreover, querying the CODIS-linked databases for the purpose of 
identification was held not to be a search subject to the Fourth 
Amendment by the King Court, despite the issue being given relatively 
little attention by the majority and vigorously opposed by the 
dissent.153 Indeed, the Supreme Court has never considered a database 
query to be a constitutional event.154 
Assessing the Fourth Amendment interests of the relatives of the 
databased individual is more difficult. Unlike an offender whose DNA 
profile was collected while in custody and subsequently searched by 
CODIS, the offender’s relatives’ expectation of privacy is not 
diminished due to an arrest. The overlap of their DNA with that of 
their offender-relative is the result of “biology, not choice. Indeed, 
genetic ties are both involuntary and immutable. They cannot be 
 
 148. Id. at 19. 
 149. Ram, supra note 141, at 10. 
 150. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 98, at 334. 
 151. Id. at 334–35. 
 152. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 464–65 (2013). 
 153. See generally id. at 464–82 (majority opinion and Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 154. See Emily Berman, When Database Queries Are Fourth Amendment Searches, 102 MINN. 
L. REV. 577, 603–04 (2017). 
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controlled or escaped.”155 It is unclear, however, if such relatives even 
have a privacy interest being infringed.156 The profile used to conduct 
the CODIS search is not derived from their cells.157 Further, it is 
unclear what harm, if any, these relatives suffer, and whether such 
harm results from a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.158 
Because the genetic information stored in CODIS databases is 
comprised of identifying “junk” only, FDS does not implicate 
information nearly as intimately personal as does genetic genealogy 
investigations. And because FDS cannot identify relatives as far 
removed as GEDmatch can, these investigations do not involve trained 
genealogists constructing extensive family trees. Accordingly, FDS is 
significantly less intrusive than genetic genealogy. Thus, it is difficult 
to imagine what injury the relatives of databased individuals might 
suffer. Simply casting temporary suspicion on these individuals, 
absent more, is unlikely to be deemed intrusive enough to trigger 
Fourth Amendment protections. 
Nevertheless, some argue familial DNA searches should be 
prohibited because “they embody the very presumptions that our 
constitutional and evidentiary rules have long endeavored to 
counteract: guilt by association, racial discrimination, propensity, and 
even biological determinism.”159 Professor Erin Murphy argues the 
constitutional focus should be on the use and further searching of 
lawfully collected DNA samples, rather than on the initial collection 
of the sample.160 Murphy has articulated one such hypothetical view a 
court could take to find a familial DNA search to violate the Fourth 
Amendment: 
The partial match search itself constitutes the unauthorized 
act. Its unreasonableness would hinge upon the arbitrariness 
of casting suspicion on offender relatives, as well as the 
impermissibility of exploiting databases compiled on the 
premise of lessened privacy of offenders to access the fully 
protected DNA profiles of relatives. . . . In stark terms: the 
partial match search, and the inference drawn from the match 
itself, invoke constitutional scrutiny because they intrude on 
 
 155. Ram, supra note 141, at 11. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 98, at 334. 
 159. Id. at 304. 
 160. Id. at 335–36. 
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the legitimate expectation of privacy held by the relative in 
her half of the offender’s genetic code, and are impermissible 
because they do so without individualized or particularized 
suspicion. The rationale justifying such warrantless, 
suspicionless searches in the case of a direct match—namely, 
the diminished expectation of privacy and recidivist threat of 
convicted offenders—is absent when it comes to relatives, 
who retain the full force of Fourth Amendment protection.161 
Not all agree with Professor Murphy’s formulation, however. 
Rather, FDS could be framed as nothing more than a comparison 
between a forensic sample and a lawfully obtained DNA profile, with 
the result—that most loci match but a few do not—reported to law 
enforcement investigators by their lab technicians.162 The inference 
that such a result indicates kinship, and any subsequent investigation 
of leads utilizing common and uncontroversial techniques, would not 
implicate the Fourth Amendment.163 Absent a violation of a databased 
individual’s relative’s Fourth Amendment rights, which the Supreme 
Court has held to be “personal,”164 that relative would have no 
recourse to address harm caused by the dissemination of intimate 
information inferred from the databased individual’s shared genetic 
information.165 While courts have yet to weigh in, the view generally 
shared by both prosecutors and defendants in the small handful of 
cases utilizing the technique that have actually gone to trial, as well as 
some legal scholars, is that the Fourth Amendment currently does not 
prohibit familial DNA searching.166 
 
 161. Id. at 336–37. 
 162. See, e.g., Jules Epstein, “Genetic Surveillance”—The Bogeyman Response to Familial 
DNA Investigations, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 141, 161. 
 163. Id. at 161–62. 
 164. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978). 
 165. Epstein, supra note 162, at 161–62. 
 166. Id. at 165; see also FIELD ET AL., supra note 146, at 21. 
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IV.  COMMERCIAL GENETIC GENEALOGY IN CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
A.  Fourth Amendment Analysis Before Carpenter 
1.  Does a Commercial Genetic Genealogical 
Investigation Constitute a Search? 
Fourth Amendment analysis of warrantless commercial genetic 
genealogy investigations by law enforcement is in many ways akin to 
the analysis of FDS—it similarly “frustrate[s] ordinary principles of 
Fourth Amendment analysis.”167 However, a stronger argument can 
be made that genetic genealogy investigations trigger Fourth 
Amendment protections because of the more revealing nature of the 
genetic information at issue. The Fourth Amendment protects against 
“unreasonable searches and seizures” of one’s “person[], house[], 
papers, and effects.”168 Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz 
v. United States,169 a trespass upon one’s real property or personal 
possessions was generally required to constitute a search.170 The Court 
abandoned such an approach in Katz, declaring that the “Fourth 
Amendment protects people—and not simply ‘areas’—against 
unreasonable searches and seizures” and that “the ‘trespass’ 
doctrine . . . can no longer be regarded as controlling.”171 In finding 
the government’s uninvited electronic eavesdropping of a 
conversation Katz was having in a public phone booth to be a violation 
of his Fourth Amendment rights, the Court established an alternate test 
to determine the existence of a protected interest: whether an 
individual had “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy . . . that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”172 
There are three primary steps that comprise a genetic genealogy 
investigation, each of which may implicate the Fourth Amendment: 
(1) the creation of the database by uploading genetic samples for 
analysis and storage as genetic profiles in the database; (2) running a 
forensic sample acquired from the crime scene through the database 
 
 167. Ram, supra note 141, at 10. 
 168. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 169. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 170. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding surveillance not 
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment absent any trespass or seizure of material object), overruled 
in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 171. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
 172. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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to find relatives, as far out as third cousins, amongst the database’s 
users; and (3) the genealogical research and building of family trees, 
tracing backward from the users’ profiles identified by the database 
query in step two to a common ancestor, and then forward from that 
ancestor to identify potential suspects in the crime being investigated. 
Because the government did not mandate the collection of the 
genetic samples used to create the profiles that comprise commercial 
databases, there would be no Fourth Amendment event at the point of 
collection (step one) as there would be with new CODIS profile 
entries, ruled a constitutional search in King.173 Law enforcement is 
not involved in the collection or analysis of any new user’s genetic 
sample, nor the derivation of the genetic information from the sample 
that allows for the creation of the profile, so the creation of the 
database and the addition of new profiles therein would not constitute 
a search. 
Steps two and three, however, are potentially Fourth Amendment 
events. Putting aside for a moment that the users of the database 
uploaded their DNA profiles willingly—would the accessing of DNA 
profiles already stored in a commercial DNA database, and the 
comparison of those profiles against a forensic sample by law 
enforcement, constitute a search under traditional Fourth Amendment 
doctrine? And would the extensive research through public records, 
the press, social media and more, necessary to build the family tree, 
constitute its own search, when all such records are public? 
The Supreme Court has held the testing of biological samples that 
reveal intimate details about the source to be a search independent of 
the collection of the sample.174 The Court has declared that one has an 
expectation of privacy in confidential information such as private 
genetic and medical information, taking into consideration the 
sensitivity of information that can be derived from biological 
samples,175 and has stated that such “intrusions must be deemed 
searches under the Fourth Amendment.”176 And while the Court in 
King held that the analysis of the respondent’s DNA was not an 
 
 173. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465 (2013). 
 174. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 98, at 335. 
 175. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1989) (“It is not disputed, 
however, that chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private medical 
facts about an employee, including whether he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.”). 
 176. Id. at 617. 
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unconstitutional intrusion on his privacy, the Court premised its 
holding on the fact that the thirteen CODIS loci were noncoding 
“junk” that revealed no personal information other than 
identification.177 The Court’s reasoning thus indicates that an 
individual could have a protected expectation of privacy in their 
genetic information if personal information were to be revealed.178 
The genetic information being accessed by law enforcement here is 
far more revealing than “junk” DNA. It seems to follow, then, that one 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their genetic information 
contained in the records of a commercial genetic genealogy database 
such as GEDmatch. 
But when law enforcement begins an investigation utilizing 
GEDmatch, it is not collecting and analyzing the samples contained 
therein, only the cold case sample found at the crime scene. Rather, 
they are searching a database that already contains such profiles, 
created by the sources of the samples themselves. So courts would 
likely follow King and determine that running a sample through 
GEDmatch is no different than fingerprint identification, and thus not 
a search.179 Indeed, lower courts have held that accessing DNA profile 
records using CODIS is not a Fourth Amendment search.180 And the 
Supreme Court has never treated database queries generally as Fourth 
Amendment events.181 In cases involving databases, the Court has 
limited its discussion to either: (a) the constitutionality of the 
collection of the information contained therein;182 (b) the adequacy of 
statutory safeguards and rules governing disclosure of information;183 
or (c) whether law enforcement reliance on mistaken database entries 
 
 177. King, 569 U.S. at 464–65. 
 178. See id. at 464. 
 179. Id. at 451–52. 
 180. See, e.g., Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“We conclude that 
accessing the records stored in the CODIS database is not a ‘search’ for Fourth Amendment 
purposes. As the Supreme Court has held, the process of matching one piece of personal 
information against government records does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 181. Berman, supra note 154, at 604. 
 182. See, e.g., King, 569 U.S. at 464 (holding collection of DNA from arrestees using buccal 
swab constitutional). 
 183. See generally Erin Murphy, Databases, Doctrine, and Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 
37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 811–17 (2010) (discussing Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), U.S. 
Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989), and Whalen v. 
Row, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)). 
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should trigger the exclusionary rule.184 Indeed, it is widely accepted 
that “the [F]ourth [A]mendment does not control how properly 
collected information is deployed.”185 Thus, it is unlikely courts would 
find step two, in isolation, to be a search solely because the 
information being accessed is more intimate than fingerprint records 
or “junk” DNA. 
The third step in a genetic genealogy investigation, the 
genealogical research and the building of the family tree, is unlikely 
to be considered a search when viewed in isolation either. Many of the 
genealogists that law enforcement agencies have hired to perform this 
step developed their skills conducting genealogy research as a hobby, 
helping adopted children find birth parents.186 Using publicly 
available information to follow leads and draw inferences is standard, 
uncontroversial detective work, and it would be difficult to argue that 
society does not expect law enforcement to conduct such 
investigations, or considers such investigations unreasonable. 
But a plausible argument can be made that when considering the 
investigatory technique as a whole—combining genetic information 
obtained through a GEDmatch query with a genealogist’s research to 
draw a host of inferences—a Fourth Amendment search has occurred. 
The Supreme Court acknowledged, in United States v. Jones,187 that 
discrete actions by law enforcement that would not rise to the level of 
a search in isolation could, in the aggregate, constitute a search,188 
often referred to as the mosaic theory. Although the majority’s holding 
in Jones—that the use of a GPS device attached to the defendant’s car 
to track his movements for twenty-eight days constituted a search—
was based on a traditional trespass theory, five Justices also 
determined a search occurred based on the defendant’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.189 This conclusion was not based on a 
 
 184. Id. at 817–21 (discussing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) and Arizona v. 
Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995)). 
 185. Berman, supra note 154, at 604 (alteration in original) (citing Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 
675, 689 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Murphy, Databases, Doctrine, and Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure, supra note 183, at 821 (“As shown, the Supreme Court has paid scant (and inconsistent) 
heed to the peculiar features of databasing or to what special concerns might inform the 
investigations conducted or evidence collected from them.”). 
 186. Murphy, She Helped Crack the Golden State Killer Case, supra note 10. 
 187. 565 U.S. 400 (2012). 
 188. See id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 189. See id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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determination that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
any single specific movement, or even in their movements over a short 
term, as one’s movements usually occur in public spaces.190 Rather, it 
was based on the effect of combining many discrete location data 
points to create a long-term surveillance of one’s movements that 
could, when combined with other information, allow inferences to be 
drawn regarding “familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations.”191 Combining long-term GPS tracking with 
additional publicly available information to make inferences resulted 
in “the Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal 
private aspects of identity [that] is susceptible to abuse.”192 
Genetic genealogy investigations are no different in this regard. 
Erin Murphy’s argument that FDS is a Fourth Amendment search—
that “the partial match search, and the inference drawn from the match 
itself, invoke constitutional scrutiny because they intrude on the 
legitimate expectation of privacy held by the relative in her half of the 
offender’s genetic code”193—is stronger in the context of genetic 
genealogy investigations. This is because genetic genealogy profiles 
reveal far more intimate information than the identifying “junk” DNA 
that comprises the profiles in CODIS databases. In genetic genealogy 
investigations, law enforcement learns not only that kinship exists, but 
how closely and on which side of the family, and it can draw 
inferences about biological characteristics of members of the family 
tree based upon the genetic information in the database profiles.194 
Because it is unlikely that either step two, the database query, or 
step three, the genealogical investigation, would constitute a search 
when viewed in isolation, the potential Fourth Amendment search 
considered in the following sections will be the overall investigative 
technique, combining these two steps into one action that may 
constitute a search. Further, this search can run against two classes of 
people: the patrons of the genetic genealogy database being queried, 
and the family members of any “hits” that a query returns, who are 
then investigated in the course of building the family tree, including 
the suspect ultimately identified by the investigation. 
 
 190. Id. at 416. 
 191. Id. at 415. 
 192. Id. at 416. 
 193. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 98, at 337. 
 194. Murphy, How an Unlikely Family History Website Transformed Cold Case Investigations, 
supra note 33. 
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2.  Third-Party Doctrine Before Carpenter 
Because the genetic information stored by a commercial genetic 
genealogy database was submitted voluntarily by its users, and the 
subsequent genealogical research is comprised entirely of publicly 
available records and information, a genetic genealogy investigation 
that might otherwise be considered a search would not implicate the 
Fourth Amendment under the third-party doctrine. Under the third-
party doctrine, articulated by the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Miller195 and Smith v. Maryland,196 “a person has no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third 
parties.”197 A commercial database’s users, therefore, like those whose 
DNA was collected pursuant to an arrest, lack a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the genetic information they have voluntarily 
submitted to the database, so law enforcement access of these records 
would not constitute a search. 
As with FDS, the analysis is less clear when determining whether 
a database user’s relatives have a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
their DNA that they share with the user, and whether that expectation 
of privacy has been intruded upon by investigators. The commercial 
database does not actually contain the personal genetic information of 
intermediary relatives on the family tree in between the forensic 
source DNA and the source’s relatives who have uploaded their DNA 
to the database. The database query only produces a record of how 
closely the source of the forensic DNA and certain database users are 
related and on which branch of their lineage, based on the overlapping 
of long stretches of autosomal DNA markers.198 Any intimate 
information revealed by the database search pertains directly only to 
the users, who relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy in 
such information under the third-party doctrine, and the source of the 
forensic sample. Accurate assumptions regarding intermediary 
relatives’ biological characteristics can be inferred based on their 
location on a lineage between the database user and the forensic 
source, but there is not actually a genetic search conducted of any 
intermediary relatives. 
 
 195. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
 196. 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 
 197. Id. at 743–44. 
 198. How Genetic Genealogy Works, supra note 45. 
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In the aggregate, however, genetic genealogical investigations 
delve very deeply into the intimate personal details of many relatives 
of the forensic source sample, potentially revealing if an individual 
“was born out of wedlock, was the product of incest, or carries genetic 
diseases.”199 It is certainly reasonable to expect such information to be 
free from government surveillance. The depth and breadth of intimate 
personal information at issue, and the speed and efficiency with which 
modern technology allows law enforcement to discover and compile 
such information, suggest the traditional third-party doctrine should 
not apply. As genetic genealogical investigations rapidly become 
faster and more efficient, they are beginning to function more akin to 
a national genetic database.200 The public’s unease with GEDmatch 
violating its terms of service to allow law enforcement access to 
investigate an assault in real time clearly demonstrates the need for a 
different approach. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United 
States v. Carpenter establishes one such approach to extending Fourth 
Amendment protection to certain types of information and 
surveillance technologies in the digital age and lays the foundation for 
further extensions. 
B.  Fourth Amendment Analysis After Carpenter 
1.  Carpenter v. United States 
The Supreme Court in Carpenter v. United States upended 
traditional third-party doctrine, recognizing that the rapid 
development of modern technologies, especially information 
technologies, has resulted in the production and storage of extensive, 
easily searchable, and highly revealing records by third parties. 
Timothy Carpenter had been convicted of multiple armed robberies of 
several Radio Shack and T-Mobile stores.201 To prove Carpenter’s 
presence at each robbery, prosecutors introduced as evidence 127 days 
of cell-site location information (CSLI), which they acquired from 
 
 199. Murphy, Genealogy Sites Have Helped Identify Suspects, supra note 88. 
 200. See Yaniv Erlich et al., Identity Inference of Genomic Data Using Long-Range Familial 
Searches, 362 SCI. 690, 690 (Nov. 9, 2018),  
https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/362/6415/690.full.pdf (predicting 99 percent of 
Caucasian Americans of Northern European descent will be identifiable through genetic genealogy 
in the near future). 
 201. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212–13 (2018). 
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Carpenter’s cellular service provider pursuant to a request under the 
Stored Communications Act, rather than a warrant.202 Carpenter 
challenged the admission of the CSLI evidence, arguing a warrant was 
required to obtain it.203 The Supreme Court agreed.204 
The Court claimed its holding to be a narrow one, simply 
declining to extend the third-party doctrine as established in Smith and 
Miller to CSLI, because CSLI reveals a “detailed chronicle of a 
person’s physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over 
several years. Such a chronicle implicates privacy concerns far beyond 
those considered in Smith and Miller.”205 But the Court went 
significantly further, recognizing that “technology has enhanced the 
Government’s capacity to encroach upon areas normally guarded from 
inquisitive eyes,”206 and continuing a line of reasoning introduced in 
Kyllo v. United States,207 and continued in Riley v. California,208 that 
sought to “preserv[e] . . . that degree of privacy against government 
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”209 
The Court in Kyllo held that law enforcement’s use of a thermal 
imager to detect heat consistent with marijuana cultivation emanating 
from the defendant’s home was a search requiring a warrant, even 
though investigators never entered the home.210 The Court explained 
that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any 
information regarding the interior of the home that could not 
otherwise have been obtained without physical “intrusion 
into a constitutionally protected area,” constitutes a search—
at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in 
general public use. This assures preservation of that degree 
of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth 
Amendment was adopted.211 
In Riley, the Court based its holding—that law enforcement 
needed a warrant to search the contents of a cell phone incident to 
 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 2223. 
 205. Id. at 2220. 
 206. Id. at 2214. 
 207. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 208. 573 U.S. 373 (2014). 
 209. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34). 
 210. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
 211. Id. at 34–35 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). 
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lawful arrest—on a recognition that cell phones contain information 
that is not only quantitatively much greater but qualitatively different 
than what might be traditionally on an arrestee’s person at the time of 
arrest.212 Because cell phones collect “many distinct types of 
information—an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a 
video—that reveal much more in combination than any isolated 
record,” because their storage capacity allows them to retain 
information stretching back to when the phone was first acquired, and 
because of the pervasiveness of cell phones in modern life, the Court 
recognized the implications of modern technology on privacy in the 
information age.213 
The Court’s reasoning in Carpenter is a direct continuation of 
Kyllo and Riley. By combining its concern for the potential for 
“seismic shifts in digital technology” to erode Fourth Amendment 
privacy interests recognized since the founding, with its well-
established recognition that “individuals have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the whole of their physical movements,”214 
the Court determined that not all information is the same, and one has 
not automatically lost all expectation of privacy in certain types of 
information just because it is retained by a third party.215 
2.  The Carpenter Criteria 
In finding CSLI to be a distinct category of information, the Court 
recognized three characteristics that distinguished it from more 
traditional types of information generally subject to the third-party 
doctrine. In so doing, the Court established criteria that can be applied 
to determine whether other types of digital information might be 
similar in nature and thus excepted from third-party doctrine. These 
criteria have provided some guidance to lower courts when 
determining whether to extend Carpenter’s holding to other fact-
patterns.216 
 
 212. Riley, 573 U.S. at 393. 
 213. Id. at 394. 
 214. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219, 2217. 
 215. Id. at 2219 (“The Government thus is not asking for a straightforward application of the 
third-party doctrine, but instead a significant extension of it to a distinct category of information.”). 
 216. See Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 900 F.3d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 
2018). 
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First, the information in question must be of a “deeply revealing 
nature.”217 Like GPS surveillance, or the contents of a cell phone, 
CSLI “provides an intimate window into a person’s life, revealing not 
only his particular movements, but through them his ‘familial, 
political, religious, and sexual associations.’ These location records 
‘hold for many Americans “the privacies of life.”’”218 
Second, the information must be of a certain “depth, breadth, and 
comprehensive reach.”219 The Court focused on the common practice 
of individuals carrying their cell phones at all times, likening them to 
ankle monitors that can “achieve[] near perfect surveillance.”220 The 
Court also focused on “the retrospective quality of the data,” 
explaining that when the Government decides to acquire a person’s 
CSLI records, it “can now travel back in time to retrace a person’s 
whereabouts,” and is only limited by the policies of cellular providers 
governing how long they retain such records.221 Further, because of its 
retrospective nature, “police need not even know in advance whether 
they want to follow a particular individual, or when.”222 
Paul Ohm has explained this factor as follows:  
Depth refers to the detail and precision of the information 
stored. . . . In contrast, breadth refers to time in two ways: 
how frequently the data is [sic] collected, and for how long 
the data has [sic] been recorded. . . . Finally, comprehensive 
reach refers to the number of people tracked in the 
database.223  
He argues that this factor reflects the Court’s embrace and revival 
of the mosaic theory, first articulated by the Court in Jones, which 
recognizes that while a particular instance of short-term surveillance 
may not amount to a search in isolation, many such instances in the 
aggregate can reveal not only quantitatively more information, but a 
 
 217. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. 
 218. Id. at 2217 (citations omitted). 
 219. See id. at 2223. 
 220. Id. at 2218. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Paul Ohm, The Many Revolutions of Carpenter, 32 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 357, 372–73 
(2019) (emphasis in original). 
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qualitatively different and more intimate kind of information, and thus 
would constitute a search.224 
Last, the collection of the information must be “automatic.”225 
The Court noted that CSLI is “continually logged for all of the 400 
million devices in the United States,” and because cell phones are such 
an integral and pervasive part of life, “[o]nly the few without cell 
phones could escape this tireless and absolute surveillance.”226 
Legal scholars have articulated the criteria for applying 
Carpenter to other types of digital information in varying ways, 
formulating somewhat different tests and emphasizing certain criteria 
over others. Paul Ohm articulates three factors derived directly from 
the text of Carpenter to determine whether the information: “(1) has a 
deeply revealing nature; (2) possesses depth, breadth, and 
comprehensive reach; and (3) results from an inescapable and 
automatic form of data collection.”227 He posits that to satisfy the third 
factor, the data collection must be inescapable because it is a 
byproduct of “services one needs to use to be a functioning member 
of today’s society,” and automatic because users of the service cannot 
refuse the data collection without forgoing use of the product or 
service.228 
Susan Freiwald and Stephen Smith articulate a variation on 
similar factors.229 Their test analyzes “whether the technique was (1) 
hidden, (2) continuous, (3) indiscriminate, and (4) intrusive.”230 Their 
first factor, whether the technique is hidden, reflects the Court’s 
concern that society would not reasonably expect law enforcement to 
be secretly monitoring and recording every single person’s 
movements over an extended period of time.231 In essence, this factor 
embodies the traditional Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test. 
The second factor, whether the technique is continuous, reflects the 
Court’s concern with retrospectivity.232 The third factor, whether the 
 
 224. Id. at 373. 
 225. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2223. 
 226. Id. at 2218. 
 227. Ohm, supra note 223, at 378. 
 228. Id. at 376–77. 
 229. See Susan Freiwald & Stephen Wm. Smith, The Carpenter Chronicle: A Near Perfect 
Surveillance, 132 HARV. L. REV. 205, 219 (2018). 
 230. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 220. 
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technique is indiscriminate, looks at the pervasiveness of the 
information collection, and whether it “poses the danger of 
government fishing expeditions through databases,” reflecting the 
Founders’ fear of general warrants.233 The fourth factor, intrusiveness, 
is the equivalent of Paul Ohm’s “deeply revealing nature” factor, and 
they similarly add “expense and efficiency” as a factor as well.234 
Orin Kerr articulates a different test for applying Carpenter, 
based on his theory of equilibrium-adjustment, which argues that 
“[w]hen technology expands government power in a transformative 
way, courts change the Fourth Amendment rules to restore preexisting 
limits on that power.”235 This practice is evident in the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Kyllo236 and Riley.237 Kerr argues that after 
Carpenter, what triggers a search is not actually the content of the 
information law enforcement acquires, but whether, because of a 
“broader technological shift,” law enforcement can access today 
records it could not access traditionally.238 “When technology enables 
surveillance that could not occur before, the new surveillance becomes 
a search. To avoid a dramatic increase in government power, the new 
surveillance tools that digital technology creates are to be slotted into 
the legal box of searches that require a warrant.”239 
 
 233. Id. 
 234. See id; see also Ohm, supra note 223, at 378. 
 235. ORIN S. KERR, THE DIGITAL FOURTH AMENDMENT,  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3301257 (forthcoming) (manuscript at 8)  
(December 19, 2018 draft). 
 236. In Kyllo, the Supreme Court noted,  
[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior 
of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 
“intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,” constitutes a search—at least 
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use. This assures 
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the 
Fourth Amendment was adopted. 
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 
512 (1961)). 
 237. In Riley, the Supreme Court noted,  
Today, by contrast, it is no exaggeration to say that many of the more than 90% of 
American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of 
nearly every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate. Allowing the 
police to scrutinize such records on a routine basis is quite different from allowing 
them to search a personal item or two in the occasional case. 
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395 (2014) (citation omitted). 
 238. KERR, supra note 235 (manuscript at 10). 
 239. Id. 
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Kerr identifies three requirements for Carpenter to apply to a 
particular type of record, thus necessitating a warrant for that record 
to be searched, regardless of whether it is held by a third party. First, 
“[t]he records must be of a kind and nature that generally could not be 
collected in a pre-digital age.”240 Traditional records are still subject 
to the traditional third-party doctrine, as the Court makes clear in its 
holding.241 Second, the records must have been “created without the 
subject’s meaningful voluntary choice,” or “inescapably . . . through 
use of broadly-used services.”242 Last, the records must “reveal an 
intimate portrait of a person’s life typically beyond legitimate state 
interest.”243 According to Kerr, any information satisfying these three 
criteria is subject to Carpenter protection, and the use by law 
enforcement of “a digital technology . . . that was unavailable before 
the digital age” to access such information is a search.244 
3.  Does Carpenter Protect Genetic Genealogy Information? 
It is unlikely Carpenter affords Fourth Amendment protection to 
information obtained from genetic genealogy investigations. The 
information is clearly of a “deeply revealing nature.” It likely also 
satisfies the “depth, breadth, and comprehensiveness” criterion. 
However, the collection of the information by the database is not 
“inescapable and automatic,” at least as pertains to the database user. 
This deficiency would most likely prove fatal, precluding extension of 
Carpenter to genetic genealogy database information, absent a 
generous extension of the underlying policy concerns that led the 
Court to its decision. 
a.  Deeply revealing nature 
The information contained in genetic genealogy profiles, and the 
information that can be gleaned from subsequent genealogical 
research and attendant inferences, is easily as intimate as CSLI data, 
if not more so. The Court in Carpenter was concerned about CSLI 
data because of the intimate details of a person’s life that could be 
 
 240. Id. (manuscript at 16). 
 241. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216–17 (2018). 
 242. KERR, supra note 235 (manuscript at 20). 
 243. Id. (manuscript at 22). 
 244. Id. (manuscript at 40).  
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learned by combining a record of a person’s location over time with 
other available information, and drawing inferences.245 Those 
inferences could reveal “familial, political, professional, religious, and 
sexual associations.”246 
Here, by combining the wealth of genetic information contained 
in the genetic profiles of a GEDmatch user and a related forensic 
sample, with knowledge regarding the user’s degree of kinship with 
his or her intermediary relatives on the family tree between the two, 
law enforcement can glean deeply revealing information about the 
entire familial line, including “predisposition for a particular disease 
or other hereditary factors not relevant to identity.”247 Concerns raised 
about the sensitivity of information that might be disclosed through 
FDS, such as “abandoned parental bonds, adoptee relationships, 
children conceived through technology, even family secrets about 
paternal identity,”248 are even more pressing in the context of a 
database like GEDmatch, where the genetic information stored is so 
much more detailed.249 
b.  Breadth, depth and comprehensiveness 
Genetic genealogy information likely also satisfies the “depth, 
breadth, and comprehensive reach” requirement for Carpenter 
protection. Applying Paul Ohm’s formulation of this requirement, 
genetic genealogy information has the requisite depth because it is 
highly detailed and precise, as discussed above. And while the CSLI 
the Court considered in Carpenter was in actuality not all that 
accurate, the Court took into consideration the rapid development of 
the technology at issue and increases in accuracy certain to come.250 
Similarly, the accuracy of genetic testing technology, and the level of 
detail it can now reveal, has developed at a rapid clip, from the 
inception of CODIS in December 1990, to the first cold case suspect 
identified through genetic genealogy in April 2018, to more than forty 
 
 245. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012)). 
 246. Id. (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 415). 
 247. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 464–65 (2013). 
 248. Murphy, Relative Doubt, supra note 98, at 315. 
 249. Ram, supra note 141, at 12. 
 250. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219. 
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by mid-2019.251 There is no reason to suspect it will not continue to 
improve. 
Genetic genealogy data also likely have the requisite 
comprehensive reach. The Carpenter Court noted there were, at the 
time the case was decided, 400 million cell phones in use in the United 
States, each of which essentially conveyed a log of its owner’s 
movements to the service provider.252 While use of genetic genealogy 
databases is nowhere near as pervasive, more than fifteen million 
people have submitted their genetic information to at least one such 
database, and geneticists currently predict that 60 percent of searches 
of DNA of Americans of Northern European descent will yield at least 
a third cousin, thereby making them identifiable when combined with 
other demographic information.253 This percentage is expected to 
jump to 99 percent within a few years.254 Thus it likely would be 
considered sufficiently comprehensive in nature to satisfy this 
requirement. 
The “breadth” requirement, which refers to “how frequently the 
data is [sic] collected, and for how long the data has [sic] been 
recorded,”255 is inapplicable to genomic data. While genetic 
information is only collected once per user, one’s DNA is static and 
needs only be collected once to reveal all that it contains, unlike CSLI, 
which reveals more information the longer and more frequently it is 
recorded. Thus the “depth, breadth, and comprehensiveness” 
requirement is satisfied. 
c.  Inescapable and automatic 
Genetic genealogy information fails the Carpenter test because 
its collection is not inescapable and automatic. This characteristic of 
CSLI data was critical to the Court’s holding, as the Court was 
considering whether the defendant’s (technically) voluntary 
transmission of his location information to his service provider 
resulting from his choice to carry a cell phone should destroy any 
reasonable expectation of privacy he might otherwise have had in that 
 
 251. Zhang, supra note 31; Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), FBI, 
https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis (last visited June 23, 2020). 
 252. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218. 
 253. Erlich et al., supra note 200, at 690. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Ohm, supra note 223, at 372. 
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information.256 In holding that it should not, the Court emphasized that 
CSLI collection was inescapable because “cell phones and the services 
they provide are ‘such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that 
carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern society.”257 
And its collection was automatic because “a cell phone logs a cell-site 
record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative act on the part 
of the user beyond powering up.”258 
Genomic data collection fails in both of these regards. Genetic 
genealogy services are not a “pervasive and insistent part of daily life.” 
People generally use these services out of curiosity, as a hobby. There 
is certainly no need to do so to participate in modern society. Perhaps 
an argument can be made that relatives of genealogy database users 
had no input in the decision to upload the portions of their DNA that 
they share with users, and therefore the collection of their genetic data 
was inescapable. But this argument ignores what the Court found most 
compelling about the inescapable and automatic nature of CSLI 
collection: that it was an unavoidable byproduct of cell phone use, 
which was necessary to participate in modern society. “Carpenter 
applies to records that are necessarily created when a person uses core 
technologies of the digital age. However, it does not apply to records 
that a user might choose to create beyond what participation in modern 
Internet life requires.”259 
This requirement was also integral to the Seventh Circuit’s 
reasoning in Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of 
Naperville,260 the only case thus far in which a federal circuit court has 
found Carpenter to apply to government collection of digital data 
other than CSLI.261 There, the Seventh Circuit found the city of 
Naperville’s installation of “smart meters” in homes, which recorded 
electricity consumption at fifteen minute intervals and stored the data 
for three years, to constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.262 
Because different home appliances have “distinct energy-
 
 256. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217–18. 
 257. Id. at 2220 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)). 
 258. Id. 
 259. KERR, supra note 235 (manuscript at 3). 
 260. 900 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 261. See id. at 527. 
 262. Id. at 524–25. 
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consumption patterns or ‘load signatures,’”263 the smart meter data 
revealed “intimate personal details of the City’s electric customers 
such as when people are home and when the home is vacant, sleeping 
routines, eating routines, specific appliance types in the home and 
when used, and charging data for plug-in vehicles that can be used to 
identify travel routines and history.”264 In analyzing whether the third-
party doctrine applied, the only Carpenter requirement the court 
addressed directly was whether the data collection was inescapable 
and automatic.265 The Seventh Circuit determined Carpenter applied, 
and thus the third-party doctrine did not, because residents of 
Naperville could not choose not to have a smart meter installed in their 
home without forgoing electricity altogether, declaring that “a choice 
to share data imposed by fiat is no choice at all.”266 The court 
elaborated:  
If a person does not—in any meaningful sense—“voluntarily 
‘assume the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive dossier of 
physical movements” by choosing to use a cell phone, it also 
goes that a home occupant does not assume the risk of near 
constant monitoring by choosing to have electricity in her 
home.267 
Since this characteristic is wholly absent from genetic genealogy 
data, this requirement would not be satisfied. Given its importance to 
the Court’s reasoning in Carpenter, this deficiency likely means 
genetic genealogy data obtained from consumer genomic services 
would not be excepted from the traditional third-party doctrine under 
Carpenter. 
d.  Efficiency, equilibrium-adjustment, and technological 
equivalence 
Under a strict application of the criteria the Court articulated in 
Carpenter, genetic genealogy data accessed via consumer services 
would not be afforded Fourth Amendment protection. But the Court’s 
concern with the efficiency advantage afforded law enforcement in its 
surveillance efforts by modern technologies—a thermal imaging 
 
 263. Id. at 524 (quoting Ramyar Rashed Mohassel et al., A Survey on Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure, 63 INT’L J. ELECTRICAL POWER & ENERGY SYSS. 473, 478 (2014)). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 527. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. (citation omitted). 
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camera in Kyllo, a GPS tracking device in Jones, a cell phone in Riley, 
and CSLI data in Carpenter—clearly applies here. Consumer genetic 
genealogy services represent a huge leap forward in law enforcement 
surveillance capabilities, granting investigators access to what in 
practice amounts to a genetic database of a large contingent of 
Americans who have committed no crimes. 
Prior to a sudden advance in surveillance technology, the 
government’s ability to surveil is constrained by practical 
considerations such as time, resources, and difficulty acquiring the 
information sought.268 These constraints inform the types of 
surveillance to which society might expect to be subjected.269 Sudden 
and rapid advances in surveillance technology upset these 
expectations.270 As the Court noted, prior to GPS and CSLI 
technologies,  
law enforcement might have pursued a suspect for a brief 
stretch, but doing so “for any extended period of time was 
difficult and costly and therefore rarely undertaken.” For that 
reason, “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement 
agents and others would not—and indeed, in the main, 
simply could not—secretly monitor and catalogue every 
single movement . . . for a very long period.”271  
Moreover, the Court considered societal expectations of privacy 
in conjunction with the “basic guideposts” of the Fourth Amendment 
as understood by the Founders: “First, that the Amendment seeks to 
secure ‘the privacies of life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’ Second, and 
relatedly, that a central aim of the Framers was ‘to place obstacles in 
the way of a too permeating police surveillance.’”272 
Genetic genealogy investigations clearly implicate these 
interrelated concerns. Society’s expectation of police surveillance 
capabilities does not include the ability to search a genetic database 
comprised of a large percentage of the American public. This is 
evident by the level of public interest in the technique and the 
investigations in which it has been utilized; the tenor of the 
conversation surrounding it; and the backlash GEDmatch received 
 
 268. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 269. Id. at 430. 
 270. See id. 
 271. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (quoting Jones, 565 U.S. at 430). 
 272. Id. at 2214 (citations omitted). 
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when it contravened its own terms of service. These investigations 
certainly seem to utilize a “permeating police surveillance” into “the 
privacies of life.” 
The Supreme Court’s attention to these concerns throughout its 
case law applying the Fourth Amendment to advances in surveillance 
technologies has informed two related but distinct theories of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence: equilibrium-adjustment and technological 
equivalence. 
Orin Kerr’s theory of equilibrium-adjustment  posits that “[w]hen 
new tools and new practices threaten to expand or contract police 
power in a significant way, courts adjust the level of Fourth 
Amendment protection to try to restore the prior equilibrium.”273 Kerr 
declares Carpenter to be “a resounding win for the theory of 
equilibrium-adjustment.”274 The Court’s reasoning in Carpenter was 
that  
[i]f the police can easily take investigative steps that far 
exceed their powers in the past . . . that newfound ability 
violates a reasonable expectation of privacy. . . . [T]he 
question is whether technological change has rendered 
obsolete a past expectation of a practical limit on government 
power.275 
Kerr points to a crucial shift in the Court’s reasoning from past 
precedent: “Before Carpenter, the Katz test was about places and 
things. The law asked whether government action violated a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular place or thing. 
Carpenter asks a different question: Has technology changed 
expectations of what the police can do?”276 He acknowledges the 
importance of the information’s deeply revealing nature but argues 
that 
[t]he trigger for the search was not the details of what the 
police learned about Carpenter in that particular case. 
Instead, the trigger was the broader technological shift that 
enabled the police to learn a lot about everyone who used a 
 
 273. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 476, 480 (2011). 
 274. KERR, supra note 235 (manuscript at 1). 
 275. Id. (manuscript at 8). 
 276. Id. (manuscript at 7) (emphasis in original). 
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cell phone—that is, everyone. It’s as if the technology 
violated a reasonable expectation of privacy rather than the 
government.277 
The theory of technological equivalence similarly focuses on the 
rapid development of surveillance technology and the effect it has on 
society’s expectation of privacy as a whole. 
At least seven justices of the Carpenter Court suggest a 
heretofore unrecognized rule building on Kyllo: the rule of 
technological equivalence. If a technology, or near-future 
improvement, gives police the power to gather information 
that is the “modern-day equivalent” of activity that has been 
held to be a Fourth Amendment search, the use of that 
technology is also a search.278 
 Paul Ohm argues that previously, “the Supreme Court has tended 
to pay more attention to the nature of the police intrusion required to 
obtain information than to the nature of the information obtained.”279 
In Carpenter, however, the Court focused on whether there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the data themselves, viewed in 
isolation.280 Critical to this analysis was whether this was information 
previously accessible to law enforcement, either at all or without a 
prohibitively expensive allocation of resources, prior to the advent of 
the technology utilized to access the data.281 Ohm ties technological 
equivalence to equilibrium-adjustment in arguing that the objective 
prong of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test should be purely 
normative, rather than descriptive: courts should consider whether the 
type and extent of surveillance made possible by a new technology are 
acceptable to society, or whether they instead should be limited or 
proscribed, without attempting to discern how society might actually 
feel about the technology at that moment in time.282 
Commercial genetic genealogy investigations and the data they 
reveal fail a mechanical application of Carpenter because the data 
collection is not inescapable or automatic, critical to the Court’s 
 
 277. Id. (manuscript at 10). 
 278. Ohm, supra note 223, at 359–60 (emphasis in original). 
 279. Id. at 362. 
 280. Id. at 362–63. 
 281. See id. at 367–68 
 282. Id. at 387–88. 
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analysis in Carpenter and the extension of its holding to any new type 
of database.283 Not only do users provide the information to the 
databases voluntarily, they do so for the express purpose of making 
connections to other users and investigating one’s family tree. But 
genetic genealogy investigations by law enforcement trigger the same 
broad concerns that inform equilibrium-adjustment and technological 
equivalence. Indeed, this new investigative technique intuitively 
seems like it should qualify for protection under Carpenter, for it has 
raised serious privacy concerns amongst the public and sparked user 
backlash against consumer genomic service providers that have 
relaxed or violated their privacy policies by cooperating with law 
enforcement. 
Commercial genealogy databases greatly increase police power 
to investigate crimes—not only decades’ old cold cases, but recently 
committed crimes in real time—by utilizing what is rapidly becoming 
the functional equivalent of a genetic database of a large portion of 
Americans. Law enforcement in Centerville, Utah used the technique 
to catch an assailant who was still at large only a few months after he 
assaulted a woman at a local church.284 Investigations that took weeks 
in early 2018 are now identifying suspects in a matter of days.285 
Police power has clearly expanded in a very significant way. Under 
the theory of equilibrium-adjustment, courts should be expected to 
respond in kind to restore balance. It is reasonable to assume that 
society’s current expectation is that police do not have access to a 
database of the DNA of millions of people, who have committed no 
crime, that police cannot utilize such database to identify them or their 
relatives in the course of investigating a crime, while simultaneously 
accessing a wealth of intimate biological information derived from 
their genomes. 
And the theory of technological equivalence should similarly 
advocate for Fourth Amendment protection of commercial genomic 
databases. Comparing a genetic sample retrieved at a crime scene to a 
database of millions of Americans would have been inconceivable to 
 
 283. See id. at 376–77; Freiwald & Smith, supra note 229, at 219–20; KERR, supra note 235 
(manuscript at 3). 
 284. Aldhous, supra note 80. 
 285. Megan Molteni, The Key to Cracking Cold Cases Might Be Genealogy Sites, WIRED 
(June 1, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/police-will-crack-a-lot-more-cold-cases-
with-dna/. 
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the Founders. And as recently as 2013, the Supreme Court in King 
emphasized that “[i]f in the future police analyze samples to 
determine, for instance, an arrestee’s predisposition for a particular 
disease or other hereditary factors not relevant to identity, that case 
would present additional privacy concerns not present here.”286 The 
dissent warned that law enforcement would be able to collect DNA 
from individuals for even minor offenses and thereby build a national 
database.287 Indeed, private companies have created what will soon be 
the functional equivalent of a national genetic database at law 
enforcement’s disposal. Because genetic genealogy investigations 
utilize a new technology to acquire information that just six years ago 
the Supreme Court acknowledged, at least implicitly, would constitute 
a search, the theory of technological equivalence says such 
investigations should be treated as searches under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
While both equilibrium-adjustment and technological 
equivalence seem to argue in favor of treating genetic genealogy 
investigations as Fourth Amendment searches, the technique simply 
does not fit the Carpenter test, and thus, absent further extension of 
Carpenter by courts, would not constitute a search. 
C.  Assuming a Search—Is It Lawful? 
Were courts to extend Carpenter such that forensic genetic 
genealogy would constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment, the 
technique would be lawful only if conducted pursuant to a warrant, or 
if deemed reasonable by courts. Because obtaining a warrant would be 
impracticable, if not impossible, courts would employ a balancing test, 
weighing law enforcement interests against privacy interests,288 likely 
finding such searches reasonable when employed to solve particularly 
heinous crimes, but not lesser ones. 
1.  The Warrant Preference 
First, while obtaining a warrant would make such a search 
presumptively reasonable,289 courts would likely deem warrants to be 
impracticable and therefore not required, notwithstanding that a judge 
 
 286. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 464–65 (2013). 
 287. Id. at 481 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 288. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–21 (1968). 
 289. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018). 
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recently issued such a warrant for the first time. In July 2019, Judge 
Patricia Strowbridge of the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court of Florida 
issued a warrant to a Florida detective to override GEDmatch’s 
recently enacted automatic opt-out privacy policy, thus allowing him 
to search the entire database.290 Whether this constitutes an outlier or 
the first of many remains to be seen. The actual warrant and 
application have not been released publicly, but it is likely Judge 
Strowbridge did not consider law enforcement’s use of GEDmatch to 
be a search of records in which the users had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy. Rather, she likely considered the GEDmatch database and 
the genetic information contained therein to be GEDmatch’s 
proprietary records, under the third-party doctrine, so the warrant was 
likely written to override any objection GEDmatch might have made 
to the search, without addressing the users at all. Probable cause was 
likely supported solely by the success rate of such investigations in 
identifying a suspect, currently 60 percent if the perpetrator is 
Caucasian and of Northern European descent.291 This is concerning in 
and of itself, for if law enforcement’s justification for accessing these 
records is based on the third-party doctrine, an explicit opt-out should 
counter that rationale.292 But if courts extend Carpenter to find that 
GEDmatch users and their relatives have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their genetic data, this line of reasoning would not hold up, 
and obtaining a warrant would be impracticable, if not impossible. 
There would be no way to describe the exact persons to be searched, 
other than to search each of the millions of databased individuals, 
much like the general warrants the Fourth Amendment was designed 
to protect against.293 
 
 290. Hill & Murphy, supra note 12. 
 291. Erlich et al., supra note 200. 
 292. See Aaron Mak, We May Be Entering a New Era for Using Consumer Genetic Information 
to Solve Crimes, SLATE (Nov. 8, 2019, 4:01 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/11/gedmatch-
warrant-dna-ancestry-23andme.html (“‘Law enforcement has repeatedly asserted that the reason 
it’s OK for them to use this kind of consumer genetics data is because it’s all voluntarily shared,’ 
says Natalie Ram, an associate law professor at the University of Maryland. ‘To then override an 
explicit opt-out seems quite troubling.’”). 
 293. See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213 (“The Founding generation crafted the Fourth 
Amendment as a ‘response to the reviled “general warrants” and “writs of assistance” of the 
colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search 
for evidence of criminal activity.’” (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014))). 
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2.  Individualized Suspicion 
Absent a warrant, courts must deem genetic genealogy 
investigations reasonable to be lawful. But the lack of individualized 
suspicion inherent in such searches poses a major impediment to 
validating them based on a traditional reasonableness balancing 
inquiry. For a search to be reasonable, the Fourth Amendment requires 
some level of individualized suspicion—either probable cause or 
reasonable suspicion—to support law enforcement’s belief that 
searching the individual will lead to evidence of the crime being 
investigated.294 Here, there would be none, as it would be impossible 
for law enforcement to have any specific, articulable facts informing 
a belief that the search of the profile of a specific person in the 
database will yield a connection to an unknown perpetrator’s genetic 
material. And, because these searches are for normal criminal 
investigative purposes, they cannot readily be justified as special 
needs searches, which do not require individualized suspicion.295 
CODIS searches lack individualized suspicion in much the same 
way as forensic genealogy searches, but are nonetheless considered 
constitutional under King.296 But the Supreme Court in King 
considered the search at issue to be the acquisition of genetic samples 
from arrestees, not the practice of uploading those samples to CODIS 
and looking for matching profiles.297 The Court accepted that the 
primary purpose of DNA collection and storage was to more 
accurately identify arrestees, rather than to generate leads in unsolved 
crimes. Because the search was of an individual arrestee with a 
diminished expectation of privacy, there was no individualized 
suspicion issue, so the Court conducted a balancing test and found the 
search reasonable.298 
The dissent, however, correctly identified the primary state 
interest in maintaining CODIS—matching unidentified genetic 
evidence to databased individuals to identify suspects.299 Accordingly, 
the dissent excoriated the majority for even conducting a balancing 
 
 294. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (“A search or seizure is 
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 295. See id. at 41–42. 
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test in the first place, because “[n]o matter the degree of invasiveness, 
suspicionless searches are never allowed if their principal end is 
ordinary crime-solving.”300 Here, forensic genetic genealogy 
investigations by law enforcement serve no plausible alternative 
purpose other than criminal investigation that might allow a court to 
get around a lack of individualized suspicion to even conduct a 
reasonableness balancing test, and thus such searches should be 
unlawful. 
3.  Reasonableness 
Were a court to put aside the lack of individualized suspicion, 
such searches would likely be found reasonable only when the crimes 
at issue are particularly severe. The state interests in utilizing this 
technique are compelling. There is a strong state interest in solving 
crime, of course, and in particular especially violent crimes that have 
proven unsolvable by traditional means. Moreover, the technique will 
likely prove valuable in exonerating wrongfully convicted individuals 
by buttressing evidence of mismatched DNA with compelling 
evidence that someone else entirely was the actual perpetrator. 
Further, solving decades-old cold cases can bring closure and 
emotional relief to families that have suffered for years. And the 
technique has already proven effective, reliable and efficient at doing 
so. However, the state interests weaken as the crimes become less 
severe and the need to solve them becomes less critical. They may 
further weaken when traditional investigative techniques have not yet 
been exhausted, and thus may still prove successful. 
The privacy interests implicated are compelling as well, and 
genealogical investigations can be quite intrusive. One’s genetic 
information is intimate, detailed, and highly revealing. It can reveal 
unknown or undisclosed personal traits, predisposition to diseases and 
other ailments, and other private information. It can also reveal private 
or unknown family relationships, which could prove devastating if 
disclosed. Such information is certainly as revealing and thus as 
intrusive as CSLI.301 Further, the technique casts suspicion on many 
 
 300. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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people for no reason other than an immutable genetic connection. 
Such suspicion, and traditional forms of investigation that might 
follow, can greatly affect one’s reputation, career, and personal 
relationships. 
Thus, balancing these competing interests, a court would likely 
find forensic genetic genealogy investigations reasonable when the 
state interests are strongest: when the crime at issue is particularly 
severe, such as homicide and certain violent or sexual crimes, and 
when all other investigative techniques have been exhausted. Under 
these circumstances, the state interests are significantly stronger than 
they were in Carpenter, and thus the balance would tip in favor of the 
government. However, absent these circumstances, if forensic 
genealogy were being used to investigate more common crimes right 
after they occur, where traditional investigative techniques were still 
available, then the reasonableness balancing analysis should track 
Carpenter, and courts should find these searches to be unreasonable. 
V.  POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS 
Law enforcement’s use of forensic genetic genealogy to 
investigate crimes is not currently governed by any legislation or 
regulations, and is proliferating rapidly.302 Given the sensitivity and 
intimate nature of genetic information, how intrusive forensic genetic 
genealogy investigations can be, and that the Fourth Amendment 
likely provides no constraints under current jurisprudence, it is critical 
that legislation be crafted to provide guidance and set boundaries. 
Public sentiment regarding the practice is conflicted and unclear, and 
database privacy policies alone are insufficient to provide adequate 
protection of people’s private genetic information, especially if 
warrants overriding such protections become more common. 
Maryland has already introduced a bill banning the technique outright, 
but it has not yet been enacted.303 Given the compelling state interests 
the technique serves, the privacy concerns it implicates, and the 
conflicted state of public sentiment regarding both, legislators and the 
public at large must weigh a number of factors in order to properly 
 
associations.’ These location records ‘hold for many Americans the “privacies of life.”’” (quoting 
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(10) 53.4_SELVIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/2/20  6:50 PM 
1062 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:1015 
balance state and private interests and delineate acceptable parameters 
for this method of criminal investigation. 
Public sentiment regarding the technique is difficult to accurately 
gauge. Two separate 2018 studies suggest the public supports law 
enforcement’s use of their genetic data to solve particularly serious 
crimes. The first, a self-published survey genealogist Maurice Gleeson 
conducted of other genealogists, found that 85 percent of respondents 
were “reasonably comfortable” when their DNA was being used to 
solve homicides and serial rapes, but only 47 percent were supportive 
when used to solve lesser crimes.304 A more formal study published in 
October 2018 by a group of researchers led by Christina J. Guerrini at 
the Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy at Baylor College of 
Medicine in Houston, Texas, contained similar findings: 
Among the 1,587 respondents, the majority supported police 
searches of genetic websites that identify genetic relatives 
(79%) and disclosure of [direct-to-consumer] genetic testing 
customer information to police (62%), as well as the creation 
of fake profiles of individuals by police on genealogy 
websites (65%). However, respondents were significantly 
more supportive of these activities (all p < 0.05) when the 
purpose is to identify perpetrators of violent crimes (80%), 
perpetrators of crimes against children (78%), or missing 
persons (77%) than when the purpose is to identify 
perpetrators of nonviolent crimes (39%).305 
The authors note they found the same pattern and rates of approval for 
law enforcement use of CSLI.306 
Yet the notion that the public overwhelmingly approves of law 
enforcement’s use of everyone’s DNA to solve violent crimes is belied 
by certain anecdotal evidence to the contrary. When FamilyTreeDNA 
disclosed that it had agreed to grant the FBI access to its database on 
a case by case basis, many of its users were outraged.307 “All in all, I 
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feel violated, I feel they have violated my trust as a customer,” one 
user told Buzzfeed News, who first uncovered the cooperation 
agreement, forcing the disclosure.308 Most other prominent consumer 
genetic service providers do not cooperate with law enforcement, deny 
requests for information, and resist subpoenas.309 23andMe released 
the following statement when asked about the implications of the 
Florida warrant: “We never share customer data with law enforcement 
unless we receive a legally valid request such as a search warrant or 
written court order. Upon receipt of an inquiry from law enforcement, 
we use all practical legal measures to challenge such requests in order 
to protect our customers’ privacy.”310 Such practices reflect a general 
understanding amongst these companies that their customers would be 
uncomfortable with routine use of their DNA in criminal 
investigations, for it would certainly be easier and cheaper for these 
companies to cooperate. And law enforcement practice reflects a 
similar recognition of public unease. The law enforcement community 
has admitted to being reluctant to use court orders to gain access to 
commercial genealogy databases for fear of scaring users away.311 
Public sentiment may turn not only on the severity of the crime 
but on whether these investigations feel like contemporaneous and 
pervasive surveillance. This, in turn, may be informed by whether the 
crime being investigated was recently committed, or is old and cold. 
User backlash, when GEDmatch violated its own terms of service to 
allow law enforcement to access its database to solve the assault of a 
woman in Utah, led it to institute its automatic opt-out policy.312 That 
the crime at issue was less severe than what GEDmatch’s previous 
terms of service allowed for—homicide or sexual assault—certainly 
contributed to the user backlash.313 But the crime was nevertheless 
severe: the perpetrator attacked a seventy-one-year-old woman in a 
church and choked her until she lost consciousness.314 User backlash 
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was likely also due to the real-time nature of the investigation. This 
was not a decades-old cold case—the crime had been committed only 
a few months prior to GEDmatch granting access, and the perpetrator 
was still at large.315 Thus, the backlash was most likely the product not 
only of the lessened severity of the crime, but also the sense of 
pervasive surveillance that investigations such as this one take on, 
where the crimes are fresh, the cases are active, and other investigatory 
techniques have not yet been exhausted. 
Last, people may feel comfortable with the idea of law 
enforcement using their DNA to investigate crimes in the abstract, but 
less so in practice, and so might respond positively to a survey but feel 
violated when their own data are actually accessed and utilized. 
Indeed, since October 1, 2019, only 185,000 GEDmatch users have 
opted-in to allow law enforcement matching,316 indicating a lack of 
enthusiasm, at best, for participating personally in these 
investigations. 
Given the unsettled and conflicted nature of public sentiment, and 
past instances of commercial genetic genealogy companies failing to 
properly anticipate their users’ reactions to decisions to either violate 
their own terms of service or unilaterally change them, it is clear users 
cannot rely on company privacy policies to provide sufficient 
protection. While certain databases’ terms of service have thus far 
provided robust protection, such as those of Ancestry and 23andMe, 
which do not voluntarily cooperate with law enforcement and fight 
court orders and subpoenas, others are far laxer. And even if a database 
enforces a robust privacy policy, courts may decide to follow the lead 
of Florida’s Ninth Judicial Circuit Court and issue warrants granting 
law enforcement access. While GEDmatch did not challenge the 
validity of the warrant, 23andMe has stated it would fight any warrants 
it receives, and so a proliferation of warrants does not seem imminent 
just yet. But even so, given the already unreliable nature of privacy 
policies, and the possibility of more warrants, such policies do not 
provide sufficient protection for database users’ and their relatives’ 
genetic data. Legislation is therefore needed. 
Maryland is currently the only state to have proposed a bill that 
would restrict law enforcement’s use of forensic genetic genealogy. 
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Maryland House Delegate Charles Sydnor III introduced House Bill 
30 at the first legislative session of 2019, which would have prohibited 
law enforcement from utilizing commercial genetic databases in 
criminal investigations entirely.317 The bill did not make it out of 
committee, but Mr. Sydnor plans to introduce a revised version in 
2020.318 “The policy in the state of Maryland is pretty clear: We 
shouldn’t be doing this,” he has stated.319 Maryland is also one of only 
two states with statutes prohibiting FDS.320 
It seems unlikely, however, that a complete ban comports with 
public sentiment either. Given the compelling need to solve 
particularly heinous crimes, especially those that have been cold for 
decades, a complete ban would be misguided. Rather, legislation 
should be carefully crafted that seeks to properly balance the needs of 
law enforcement to solve these crimes, with the privacy interests of 
what will soon be the large majority of the American populace 
identifiable through one of these databases. Legislation should, at least 
initially, be drawn narrowly, so law enforcement can only access the 
public’s sensitive genetic information in the most compelling of 
circumstances. With time, as law enforcement becomes better skilled 
at the technique, privacy safeguards are implemented and proven 
effective, and the public becomes accustomed to widespread use of the 
technique, use restrictions can be reevaluated, and perhaps loosened. 
Any legislation will need to address the following considerations. 
A.  Type of Crime 
Effective legislation governing law enforcement’s use of forensic 
genetic genealogy to solve crimes must clearly define the crimes for 
which law enforcement will be permitted to use the technique. Public 
sentiment seems to draw the line at homicide and violent crimes. This 
is reflected in both 2018 studies discussed above, as well as anecdotal 
evidence. In both the study by Maurice Gleeson and the study by 
Christina J. Guerrini, respondents overwhelmingly approved of law 
enforcement’s use of their DNA to solve violent crimes, but support 
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dropped by roughly half for nonviolent crimes.321 Moreover, before 
GEDmatch instituted its automatic opt-out policy, its terms of service 
made clear it allowed law enforcement use of the database to solve 
“violent crime,” which it defined as “homicide or sexual assault.”322 
GEDmatch’s 1.2 million users chose to entrust their genetic data to the 
company under these conditions. But when GEDmatch allowed law 
enforcement to search the database to investigate an aggravated 
assault, user backlash ensued. 
This calculation also reflects the inflection point where courts 
would likely find the use of this technique, if deemed a Fourth 
Amendment search, to be reasonable. Solving violent crimes is a 
stronger state interest than solving nonviolent ones, and thus likely 
outweighs the public’s privacy interests in its genetic information. For 
nonviolent crimes, courts following Carpenter should find the balance 
to track that which the Court at least implicitly struck between the 
state’s interest in investigating serial robberies and the public’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy in its CSLI data, and should 
therefore find the use of forensic genealogy unreasonable in these 
cases. 
Accordingly, the line should, at least initially, be drawn at violent 
crimes, as defined by GEDmatch’s prior terms of service—homicides 
and sexual assaults. Because initial legislation should be as narrow as 
possible, erring on the side of protecting privacy, and can be expanded 
later as public sentiment shifts, the technique should also be limited to 
investigating those sexual assaults in which the perpetrator is 
implicated in multiple such crimes, rather than single crimes. While 
this might prove controversial, such a requirement can always be 
revised downward later, if supported by the public at large. 
B.  Time Elapsed Since Crime 
Legislation should also limit use of forensic genetic genealogy to 
investigate crimes that have gone cold for some defined amount of 
time. Where to draw that line is a difficult question that will surely be 
the subject of much debate, but society seems to be more comfortable 
with law enforcement using commercial DNA databases to solve the 
decades-old Golden State Killer case than to solve the months-old 
 
 321. Guerrini et al., supra note 305; Tashea, supra note 90. 
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Washington aggravated assault. While the backlash against 
GEDmatch in the Washington case was due in part to the crime being 
less severe than the terms of service required, the contemporaneous 
nature of law enforcement’s use of the service to identify a perpetrator 
on the loose for a crime very recently committed has the feel of a more 
pervasive surveillance that likely caused many people discomfort. 
This will undoubtedly prove controversial as well. The need to 
catch perpetrators who have recently committed violent crimes and are 
still at large, and prevent them from striking again, is arguably greater 
than the need to identify now-geriatric killers and rapists whose cases 
have long since gone cold and most likely no longer pose an active 
threat to society. But requiring a certain period of time to have lapsed 
before law enforcement may utilize private DNA data prevents the 
users from having the feel of contemporaneous surveillance. It would 
also cause the purpose of the investigation to less closely resemble 
regular run-of-the-mill crime fighting and instead resemble a special 
needs search. The purpose of the search could be framed not as 
ordinary criminal investigation to catch an offender currently posing a 
danger to the public, but as bringing closure to victims’ families by 
finally resolving long unsolved cases. While courts are more 
comfortable with law enforcement searches absent individualized 
suspicion if serving a special need other than ordinary criminal 
investigation,323 it remains to be seen if such a distinction will matter 
to the public, and therefore to legislators. 
C.  Exhaustion of Other Investigatory Techniques 
Legislation should also require law enforcement to have 
exhausted all traditional, reasonable investigative techniques before 
turning to genetic genealogy. This would work in conjunction with a 
minimum elapsed time requirement, affording law enforcement the 
time needed to exhaust other techniques. This would ensure law 
enforcement would only access people’s private, sensitive genetic data 
in the most compelling of circumstances. 
D.  Training and Safeguards 
Legislation should impose training and procedural requirements 
on law enforcement to ensure genetic genealogical investigations are 
 
 323. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000). 
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narrow in scope and ethically conducted. Effective legislation must 
also adequately safeguard sensitive genetic data and the intimate, 
personal information that can be uncovered by digging into a person’s 
family tree. Protective procedures should be implemented to ensure 
private personal information, such as genetic predispositions for 
certain diseases, or unknown or undisclosed familial relationships, is 
not accidentally revealed during the course of an investigation, either 
to a subject of investigation or publicly. Such accidental disclosures 
can destroy reputations, careers, friendships and families, and must be 
effectively prevented. 
Moreover, training should focus on narrowing the scope of 
genealogical investigations by teaching law enforcement agencies 
how to properly conduct the most efficient investigation possible. This 
would minimize the number of individuals upon whom suspicion is 
cast, so as few people as possible are subjected to intrusive 
investigation. Genealogist CeCe Moore has expressed support for an 
industry certification requirement for genealogists conducting 
criminal investigations, but support amongst her colleagues is weak.324 
Effective legislation must impose such a requirement. 
E.  Evolution of Technology 
Last, effective legislation must consider the rapid evolution of 
forensic genetic genealogy technology and be adaptable accordingly. 
Limits on the technique should start quite narrowly, erring on the side 
of privacy protection. These limits may be relaxed over time, if 
training and procedural safeguards prove effective and public 
sentiment supports broadening the technique’s application. But as the 
technology continues to become more efficient and cheaper, the 
temptation to deploy it for lesser crimes will grow. As more people 
continue to entrust their genetic data to these commercial databases, 
and as algorithms improve to allow connections to fourth and fifth 
cousins, instead of just third, the functional equivalent of a national 
genetic database will emerge. Such developments would militate 
against a loosening of the restrictions endorsed above. Ultimately, 
legislators and the public will have to monitor the development of this 
technology in order to ensure an acceptable balance between privacy 
and law enforcement interests is maintained. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
The use of commercial genetic genealogy in criminal 
investigations is expanding rapidly, and the technique is quickly 
becoming faster and more efficient. The existence of the functional 
equivalent of a national genetic database is imminent, raising serious 
privacy concerns, but also creating important tools for law 
enforcement. Commercial genealogy service providers have 
attempted to implement privacy policies that strike the proper balance 
between governmental and personal privacy interests, but they have 
proven inconsistent and unreliable. And the Fourth Amendment likely 
does not apply, even under Carpenter. This is so even though the 
technique greatly enhances law enforcement surveillance power in a 
manner that should trigger an expansion of the Fourth Amendment 
under the theories of equilibrium-adjustment and technological 
equivalence. Absent such an expansion, it is critical legislation be 
enacted to protect the wealth of intimate personal information that 
genetic genealogy can reveal and prevent abuse by law enforcement. 
Such legislation should initially be drawn narrowly, permitting law 
enforcement to utilize the technique only to solve the most serious 
crimes, after a prescribed period of time, and when all other methods 
of investigation have been exhausted. Law enforcement should have 
access to this incredibly potent tool, but only when absolutely 
necessary. Thorough training and strict procedural protections must be 
implemented, for genetic genealogical investigations should only be 
permitted if the public’s privacy interest in its own intimate genetic, 
biological, and personal information can be ensured. 
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